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It seems to me imperative that we reinstill in ourselves the toughness 
and idealism that guided the nation in the past.  The paramount 
interest in self . . . must be replaced by an actual, not just a vocal, 
interest in our country, by a spirit of adventure, a will to fight what is 
evil, and a desire to serve.  It is up to us as citizens to take the initiative 
as it has been taken before in our history, to reach out boldly but with 
honesty to do the things that need to be done. 
Robert F. Kennedy1 
The world of crime had changed.  So too, it became plain, would law 
enforcement have to change. Individual [local and violent street] 
crimes…still occurred, always would, and should be prosecuted. But 
that is not what [Robert Kennedy’s Justice Department] was to devote 
their main energies to.  The local police could deal with isolated 
[local] criminal acts, and the FBI was good at solving bank robberies, 
kidnapping, and auto thefts.  The overarching crime problem was 
changing in ways law enforcement had not fully comprehended nor 
coped with adequately. 
Ronald Goldfarb2 
“‘May he live in interesting times.’” 





                                                     
 1. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN 325 (1960). 
 2. RONALD GOLDFARB, PERFECT VILLAINS, IMPERFECT HEROES: ROBERT F. KENNEDY’S 
WAR AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME 41 (1995). 
 3. Robert F. Kennedy, U.S. Senator, Address of Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Day of 
Affirmation, University of Capetown  (June 6, 1966), available at 
http://research.archives.gov/description/194041.  The website Phrasefinder suggests that the curse 
is really a post-WWII English saying, that RFK ironically popularized in his Day of Affirmation 
speech.  Gary Martin, May You Live In Interesting Times, PHRASE FINDER, 
http://phrases.org.uk/meanings/may-you-live-in-interesting-times.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).  
It is likely not of ancient Chinese origin.  Id. 
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The Travel Act, the legislative centerpiece of Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy’s newly minted federal war on organized crime, was swiftly enacted 
in September of 1961.4  The fiftieth anniversary of its enactment passed quietly 
and without significant fanfare in late 2011.5 
A larger celebration was certainly in order.6   A half-century later, the 
enactment of the Travel Act—if evaluated in conjunction with the Kennedy 
administration’s aggressive pursuit of other progressive federal criminal law 
enforcement initiatives—can be seen as a seminal moment in the evolution of 
modern federal criminal law enforcement. 
                                                     
 4. Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (1961) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006)).  As originally enacted, the Travel Act provided, in relevant part: 
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or 
foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to— 
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or  
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or 
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, 
management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, 
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs 
(1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 
five years, or both. 
(b) As used in this section “unlawful activity” means (1) any business enterprise 
involving gambling, liquor . . . narcotics, or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws 
of the State in which they are committed or of the United States, or (2) extortion or 
bribery in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States. 
§ 1952(a)–(b), 75 Stat. at 498–99. 
The Travel Act has undergone a few modifications in the last fifty years, most notably the expansion 
of the underlying predicate offenses in subsection (b) to include arson.  Act of July 7, 1965, Pub. 
L. No. 89-68, 79 Stat. 212 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2)).  In 1990, Congress expanded the 
jurisdictional requirements in subsection (a) and reconfigured the mail alternative to read 
“[w]hoever travels in interstate commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate commerce.”  
Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1064, 104 Stat. 4789, 4843 (1990) (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)).  For a detailed analysis of the intricacies of a Travel Act prosecution, see 
Barry Breen, The Travel Act: Prosecution of Interstate Acts in Aid of Racketeering, 24 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 125, 145 (1986). 
 5. See, e.g., WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2011 (making no mention of the anniversary of the 
enactment of the Travel Act). 
 6. The fiftieth anniversaries of other noteworthy events of the Kennedy administration 
prompted new books offering a half-century perspective.  See, e.g., DAVID COLEMAN, THE 
FOURTEENTH DAY: JFK AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (2012).  On January 
21, 2011 the Department of Justice commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of RFK’s swearing-in 
as attorney general with a dignified two-hour program.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice (Jan 21, 
2011), available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-ag-088.html.  Of course, in 
November of 2013, the fiftieth anniversary of President Kennedy’s assassination will be 
commemorated and heavily publicized.  See, e.g., Advertisement, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2013, at 
Weekend 25 (advertising the premier of the film “March to Justice,” an event “part of Newseum’s 
year-long exploration of John F. Kennedy’s presidency . . . to mark the 50th anniversary of his 
assassination”). 
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Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) proved prescient with his above-cited “interesting 
times” curse,7 as his comment could have just as easily been directed at the 
myriad of challenges facing contemporary federal criminal law enforcement.  
This Article examines the RFK Justice Department’s fundamental role as a 
catalyst in the development of modern federal criminal law enforcement.  
Modern federal criminal law is extremely broad, powerfully equipped with 
specific law enforcement techniques, heavily involved in public corruption 
prosecutions of state and local officials, and necessarily dependent on the broad 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in determining which cases warrant federal 
prosecution.8  The Article also discusses how modern federal criminal law 
enforcement has fared as it reaches middle age, particularly in light of the “New 
Federalism”; in the last few decades, critics have increasingly and relentlessly 
challenged the expansion of federal authority, including federal criminal law 
authority, on both constitutional and policy grounds.9 
RFK is the subject of numerous biographies and books, not surprising given 
his position as one of the princes of America’s premier political family.10  RFK’s 
relatively brief but profound tenure as attorney general is chronicled in several 
books devoted to the subject.11  In 2001, the Department of Justice Main 
Building in Washington, D.C. was dedicated in his name.12  No other attorney 
general has been the subject of such intense scrutiny and showered with such 
honor.13 
However, none of the earlier RFK scholarship was specifically designed to 
offer a half-century retrospective on his tenure as attorney general.  The books 
written specifically about RFK as attorney general and the tumultuous times he 
faced—most written at least a decade ago—were, by definition, not designed to 
offer a retrospective, viewed from the lens of history a half century later, of how 
his attorney generalship influenced the development of modern federal criminal 
law enforcement.  The previous scholarship also was not designed to offer an 
                                                     
 7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 8. See Sara Sun Beale, Reporter’s Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use When 
Considering the Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1277, 1303 (1995) (discussing 
the breadth of federal criminal law and prosecutorial discretion); Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too 
Much Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1606–24 (2012) (exploring the arguments against 
expansive federal criminal law). 
 9. See, e.g., Sohoni, supra note 8, at 1610–12. 
 10. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES (1978); 
HARRIS WOFFORD, OF KENNEDYS AND KINGS: MAKING SENSE OF THE SIXTIES (1980). 
 11. See, e.g., GOLDFARB, supra note 2; BURTON HERSH, BOBBY AND J. EDGAR: THE 
HISTORIC FACE-OFF BETWEEN THE KENNEDYS AND J. EDGAR HOOVER THAT TRANSFORMED 
AMERICA (2007); VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE (1971). 
 12. Press Release, The White House, President Dedicates Robert F. Kennedy Justice Building 
(Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov 
/news/releases/2001/11/20011120-15.html. 
 13. See id. (noting that no other attorney general is “more fondly remembered” than RFK). 
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object lesson on how RFK’s efforts influence today’s federal criminal law 
enforcement challenges. 
In the last twenty-five years, much academic literature has condemned the 
expansion of federal law as unfaithful to the Constitution and the originalist 
principles of a limited federal government.14  This movement began with a 
reinvigorated focus on the “original intent” or “original meaning” of the framers 
and gained a foothold with the election of Ronald Regan in 1980.15  More 
recently, these efforts have only intensified, to the point at which “Tea Party” 
philosophy has now rendered plausible the serious consideration of proposals to 
significantly cut back the reach of federal jurisdiction, including federal criminal 
law jurisdiction.16 
This Article analyzes the historical context of the RFK Justice Department 
and its vital role in the development of modern federal criminal law 
enforcement.  RFK’s intimate involvement in transforming federal criminal law 
is not nearly as ingrained in the nation’s collective memory as is his role in the 
tense civil rights conflicts or in the Cuban Missile Crisis, signature events of the 
Kennedy administration that occupy near hallowed status in our national 
consciousness.  A new generation should benefit greatly from a contemporary 
reexamination of RFK’s influence on the development of federal criminal law. 
  
The Article asserts that modern federal criminal law enforcement effectively 
began with RFK’s attorney generalship, principally embodied in the Travel Act 
and a handful of accompanying legislative efforts.  Understanding the historical 
context and the attendant practical realities is vital for meaningful evaluation of 
the appropriate role of federal criminal law enforcement today.  In order for 
federal criminal law enforcement to remain an effective tool for addressing 
significant national criminal justice issues, federal criminal law jurisdiction 
should not be curtailed in any significant way.  If federal criminal law 
jurisdiction is perceived as “too much” today, it is worth remembering the 
problems facing the nation in 1961, which necessitated the RFK Justice 
Department’s long-overdue expansion.  Many of those problems could resurface 
if jurisdiction were significantly curtailed. 
                                                     
 14. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 101, 147 (2001) (asserting that “those who have claimed that the original meaning of the 
Commerce Clause was narrow are right and their critics are wrong”); Sohoni, supra note 8, at 1610–
12. 
 15. See Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Question 
for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 233 (2004) (noting that the 1980s saw “the rise of 
the modern originalists” and that “the debate over originalism dominated not only the academic 
literature but also political debates”). 
 16. See Sohoni, supra note 8, at 1588–89 (“[T]he Tea Party either produced, or was a product 
of, an increase in rhetoric about government intrusiveness.”). 
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I.  THE GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION17 
The RFK Justice Department laid the essential groundwork for the necessary 
modern expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction.  RFK was one of the first 
high-profile public officials in a quarter-century to state—candidly and 
emphatically—that modern criminality had outpaced the state and local 
governments’ ability to deal effectively with the problem.18  To appreciate the 
RFK Justice Department’s influence on the development of modern federal 
criminal law, it is helpful to briefly review the evolution of federal criminal law 
from its inception to 1961, when RFK was confirmed as attorney general.19  This 
brief overview demonstrates the somewhat archaic state of federal criminal law 
in 1961. 
A.  The Revenue Acts of 1789 and the First Federal Criminal Code of 1790 
The first federal criminal laws closely tracked the few specific grants of 
federal criminal law authority set forth in the Constitution.  However, even the 
original Revenue Act of 1789 and the first Federal Criminal Code of 1790 
contained a handful of provisions that extended beyond the narrow constitutional 
grants of express federal criminal law authority.20 
Most notable was the prompt enactment of revenue offenses.  Although the 
Constitution does not expressly mention this authority, the members of the first 
Congress—many of whom were signatories of the Constitution21—recognized 
the importance of providing an effective vehicle for enforcing the vital revenue 
                                                     
 17. This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis, but merely intended to provide a brief 
contextual framework delineating the general phases of federal criminal law jurisdictional 
expansion.  For a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the first thirty years of federal criminal law 
enforcement, see DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW, 1801–1829 (1985); see also HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL 
MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL 
EXECUTIVE (1937) (providing a detailed analysis through 1937, including the creation of the 
Department of Justice).  For a concise overview, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 261–76 (1993); Beale, supra note 8, at 1278–82. 
 18. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 37 (noting RFK’s desire to reform and enforce federal 
criminal law). 
 19. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 6 (commemorating in 2011 the fiftieth 
anniversary of RFK’s swearing-in as attorney general). 
 20. Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 55–61 (1996) (discussing the birth of federal criminal law, 
which primarily, but not exclusively, closely tracked the specific constitutional grants of federal 
criminal authority). 
 21. Of the fifty-five men who signed the Constitution, eighteen served in the First Congress; 
ten as Senators, eight as members of the House.  See BARRY ADAMSON, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE SUPREME COURT 207–08 (2008).  See generally THORTON 
ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION (1993) (discussing the writing of the Constitution); 
David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress,  
1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777 (1994) (detailing the members of the constitutional 
convention). 
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laws.22  Even Anti-Federalist-leaning St. George Tucker, who was the author of 
the first comprehensive treatise on the American Constitution and otherwise 
took a very narrow view of federal criminal law jurisdiction, conceded that 
federal authority must provide a mechanism by which to enforce revenue 
offenses as a matter of the sovereign’s “inherent right of self-protection.”23 
Still, at its inception, federal criminal law was rudimentary and scant.  There 
was no Justice Department—it would not be formed until 1870—the existence 
of lower federal courts was uncertain, and the attorney generalship, which at the 
time did not confer authority over the presidentially appointed U.S. attorneys in 
each judicial district, was not considered a particularly prestigious 
appointment.24  In fact, President Washington had to persuade his close personal 
friend, Edmund Randolph, to become the first attorney general.25  Randolph 
reluctantly accepted only after he learned that he could still expect to derive most 
of his income from private practice.26 
B.  Modest Growth Until the Civil War 
After the creation of the Solicitor of the Treasury in 1830, the Department of 
the Treasury oversaw U.S. attorneys handling civil litigation concerning the 
United States.27  For criminal matters, these presidentially appointed and Senate-
confirmed “district” attorneys—as they were called at the time 
—remained “all but completely independent.”28  Given the relative dearth of 
substantive federal criminal law and the critical importance of federal revenue 
collection efforts, the emphasis on pursuing prosecution of federal revenue 
offenses is not surprising. 
                                                     
 22. See Currie, supra note 21, at 780–81 (discussing the House debate on revenue offenses 
and the subsequent enactment of laws to enforce them). 
 23. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app. at 420 (1803); see also 
Kurland, supra note 20, at 26 n.84 (discussing narrow views of constitutional federal criminal law 
authority while also recognizing the sovereign’s “inherent right of self-protection,” even without 
express constitutional authority); L.B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutor’s 
Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 64, 66–70 (1948) (discussing the inherent  
self-protective principle).  For recognition of Tucker’s Anti-Federalist sentiments, see JACKSON 
TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788, at 224 
(1974); Barnett, supra note 14, at 135–36. 
 24. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 17, at 20 (listing the few duties of the attorney 
general because of the dearth of federal criminal law). 
 25. Id. at 19. 
 26. Id. at 13, 19. 
 27. Id. at 123, 143–44, 218.  The Treasury Department organized the Secret Service in 1865 
to fight a major counterfeiting problem.  HERBERT A. JOHNSON, NANCY TRAVIS WOLFE & MARK 
JONES, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 253 (4th ed. 2008).  In 1867, Congress gave the Secret 
Service statutory authority to investigate fraud against the United States.  Id. 
 28. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 17, at 218. 
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C.  Post Civil War: The First Major Recodification Effort 
The scope of federal criminal law remained quite small until the Civil War.  
The War greatly expanded the operations of the federal government, which 
created a commensurate need for more federal criminal regulation to protect the 
relevant sovereign interests.29  In 1866, Congress authorized a commission to 
analyze, revise, identify, and eliminate redundant or obsolete provisions to 
consolidate the various federal criminal statutes passed since 1789.30  This 
commission completed this effort in 1877, which resulted in the Revised Statutes 
of the United States.31  This was the beginning of what eventually became Title 
18 of the United States Code.32  The federal crimes were arranged alphabetically, 
a simplistic organizational principle still utilized by the current Federal Criminal 
Code. 
The Department of Justice, placed under the control of the attorney general, 
was formed in 1870.33  U.S. attorneys had been removed from the Department 
of the Treasury and placed under the auspices of the attorney general in 1861.34  
This change reflected the realities of the expansion of the federal government, 
particularly federal prosecutions, which slowly expanded beyond counterfeiting 
and other revenue offenses.35  However, revenue offenses were still important, 
and the Department of Justice allocated federal investigative resources for the 
investigation cases of fraud against the government.36  These changes addressed 
the relatively new problem of fraud in connection with government contracts 
and procurements, which had grown exponentially as a result of the profiteering 
opportunities that arose from supplying the federal government’s war effort.37 
Congress enacted the first federal mail fraud statute in 1872, although its 
significance may not have been fully recognized at the time.38  For the first time, 
                                                     
 29. See Beale, supra note 8, at 1278–82. 
 30. See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 17, at 469. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 469–74. 
 33. NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA SUN BEALE & SUSAN KLEIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ITS ENFORCEMENT 5 (5th ed. 2010). 
 34. DANIEL MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE 6 (1980); Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our 
Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning there was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 567 (1989) 
(noting that the attorney general had little authority over district attorneys under the Judiciary Act).  
However, the Department of Justice apparently did not formally consolidate criminal prosecution 
within the Department until the issuance of Executive Order 6166 in 1933.  See Schwartz, supra 
note 23, at 83–84. 
 35. See JOHNSON, WOLFE & JONES, supra note 27, at 251–53. 
 36. See id. at 253 (discussing the Secret Service’s role in investigating cases of 
counterfeiting). 
 37. Id. at 251–53. 
 38. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 355, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341 (2006)).  The statute has undergone several revisions as Congress recognized the utility of 
a flexible statute criminalizing a broad range of fraudulent conduct that only required a tenuous 
connection with the use of the mails.  An 1889 revision made it unlawful to be involved in, inter 
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a federal criminal statute was directed toward crimes of which the United States 
government was not the direct victim, and the statute opened the door to the 
federal prosecution of criminal conduct that had previously been prosecuted 
almost exclusively by the states. 
D.  Modern Federal Criminal Law Enforcement: The First Wave 
1.  1890-1933 
The rapidly expanding national economy and accompanying technological 
advancements that increased national mobility in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries made local law enforcement more difficult.39  This state of 
affairs created issues of national dimension requiring a federal response.  For 
example, as part of Progressive Era impulses, Congress passed the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in 1890, which was aimed at cabining monopolistic tendencies.40  
These economic competition regulatory laws contained federal criminal 
sanctions.41  Additionally, in 1909, Congress reorganized the federal criminal 
code.42  And the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, which 
authorized the federal income tax, set the stage for the enactment of federal tax 
crimes.43  Federal income tax offenses became the nascent federal white collar 
crime statutes.44  Finally, the era saw the rise and fall of Prohibition, and with it, 
an expanded—although initially fruitless—federal law enforcement role,45 
federal regulation of food and drugs, a significant expansion of nationwide 
organized crime, the birth of the FBI, and the development of modern forensic 
techniques that would revolutionize the investigation and prosecution of crime.46 
                                                     
alia, any scheme to obtain money by or through correspondence concerning “what is commonly 
called ‘saw dust swindle,’ or ‘green articles,’ ‘green coin,’ . . . or ‘green cigars.’”  18 U.S.C.  
§ 1341.  The colorful period piece language was eventually repealed in 1949 as the superfluous 
“obsolete argot of the underworld.” Revision note to 1948 revision, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 
62 Stat. 763. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 39. JOHNSON, WOLFE & JONES, supra note 27, at 252. 
 40. See id. (describing the effect of the Sherman Antitrust Act). 
 41. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 2 (2006 & Supp. 2012)). 
 42. See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 17, at 473 (describing the adoption of a 
federal criminal code). 
 43. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 264. 
 44. See id. (noting that the IRS arrests a substantial number of “prominent people”). 
 45. For a comprehensive analysis of Prohibition’s influence on the development of several 
important federal criminal law doctrines that survive today, see KENNETH M. MURCHISON, 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINES: THE FORGOTTEN INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION 
(1994). 
 46. The advancement of scientific forensic techniques was notable in aiding criminal 
investigation and prosecution.  See DEBORAH BLUM, THE POISONER’S HANDBOOK: MURDER AND 
THE BIRTH OF FORENSIC MEDICINE IN JAZZ AGE NEW YORK 1–4 (2010) (chronicling 
advancements in forensics to help in determining if a victim was intentionally poisoned or died 
from low-quality illegal alcohol manufactured during Prohibition); JOHNSON, WOLFE & JONES, 
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The era also ushered in a myriad of new federal criminal laws.  In addition to 
the Sherman Act, Congress enacted an array of federal criminal statutes under 
the Commerce Clause. Predictably, most of these federal statutes criminalized 
conduct that also involved the most simple and clear form of interstate activity: 
the physical crossing of a state line or shipment of an article across state lines.47  
Some movement from one state to another was deemed necessary, both as a 
requisite to withstand a constitutional challenge and as a statutory element of the 
offense.48  These statutes included the Federal Lottery Act in 1895,49 the Mann 
Act in 1910 (transportation of women across state lines for immoral purposes),50 
and the Dyer Act in 1919 (knowing transportation of stolen vehicle across state 
lines).51 
Even this modest doctrinal expansion of federal criminal authority was 
controversial at the time.  Southern legislators, who were suspicious of a strong 
federal government and many of whom harbored racist tendencies, strongly 
resisted the new legislation.52  Ironically, appeals to blatant racism helped 
overcome the resistance of some Southern legislators, and thus were 
instrumental in passing the Mann Act.53  Nevertheless, for the most part, the 
Southern states rights’ potential opposition to the expansion of federal law 
enforcement became an entrenched and recurring feature of the federal criminal 
law debate until well into the 1960s.54 
                                                     
supra note 27, at 302 (detailing FBI expertise in developing the most advanced scientific techniques 
to solve crimes, such as fingerprinting and handwriting analysis). 
 47. See Beale, supra note 17, at 1278–80. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 259 (2006)).  
In Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903), the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute.  This holding served as the constitutional foundation for the Court 
to subsequently uphold a myriad of Commerce Clause-based statutes utilizing similar jurisdictional 
formulas. 
 50. White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, Pub. L. No. 277, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24 (2006)). 
 51. National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 70, 41 Stat. 324 (1919) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (2006)). 
 52. See H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to Federalize is the Road to Ruin, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1993, 
at 8, 10 (noting the South’s resistance to any intrusion on states’ rights). 
 53. See id. at 10–11 (citing relevant congressional floor debates). 
 54. See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND ORIGINS OF OUR TIME  
141–46 (2013).  Although Southern Democratic legislators largely supported President Roosevelt’s 
New Deal policies, this support was based on a devil’s bargain of sorts, in which the Southern 
legislators supported broad expansion of federal intervention in the economy only if it was linked 
with local—as opposed to federal—program administration and if expansion of federal power 
would not affect segregation.  Id. at 144–45.  Thus, expansion of the federal police power, 
particularly in areas concerning proposed anti-lynching legislation, was met with particularly 
hostile Southern opposition in Congress.  Id. at 143–44. 
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2.  1934-1950 
Beginning around the turn of the century and extending until around 1934, 
Congress enacted a spate of federal criminal statutes that focused on the physical 
crossing of a state line.  Prohibition, the New Deal, and expanding notions of the 
commerce power reshaped the scope of both federal power in general and of 
federal criminal law specifically,55 which had outgrown its adolescence 
following the expansion of the federal government after the Civil War.56  The 
modern phase of federal criminal law enforcement began with the enactment of 
Commerce Clause-based statutes, but these statutes were somewhat simplistic 
and one-dimensional. 
In 1934, largely in response to the depression-era upsurge in violent bank 
robberies, Congress enacted a series of criminal laws, including the National 
Stolen Property Act,57 and the Federal Bank Robbery Act, which made bank 
robbery a federal crime if the bank was a federally chartered bank or a state bank 
that was part of the Federal Reserve System.58  Congress also passed the first 
federal criminal firearms legislation during this period,59 as well as the Federal 
Kidnapping Act, which made the transportation of an abducted person across a 
state line a federal offense.60  At the time, this flurry of federal criminal 
legislation was considered the high water mark of the expansion of federal 
criminal jurisdiction.   
However, in the roughly quarter-century between 1934 and 1960, not much 
changed on the federal criminal law enforcement front.61  Although the 
expansiveness and utility of the Commerce Clause was no longer truly novel, 
federal law enforcement remained largely reactive, parochial, and was hampered 
by obsolete procedural limitations that made complex investigations and 
prosecutions problematic. 
                                                     
 55. See JOHNSON, WOLFE & JONES, supra note 27, at 252–57; FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 
264–67. 
 56. See JOHNSON, WOLFE & JONES, supra note 27, at 251–52; see also History of the 
Criminal Code, in HR 3160, Apr. 24, 1947 at 440 (noting that the “Civil War and Reconstruction 
period . . .gave a new impetus to federal criminal legislation during decade of the 1860s”). 
 57. National Stolen Property Act, ch. 333, 48 Stat. 794 (1934) (codified at  
18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–15 (2006)). 
 58. Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 304, 48 Stat. 78 (1934) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2006)). 
 59. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–50 
(2006 & Supp. 2009)). 
 60. Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006)).  This 
statute was enacted in response to the infamous Lindbergh baby kidnapping case.  See Barry 
Cushman, Headline Kidnappings and the Origins of the Lindbergh Law, 55 U. ST. LOUIS L. REV. 
1293, 1307 (2011).  Ironically, had the statute been in effect before the Lindbergh baby kidnapping, 
federal prosecution under the statute would not have been possible because the baby was found 
four miles from home and no state line had been crossed.  Id. at 1316. 
 61. See KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 263 (noting that, in 1960, federal law enforcement was 
still fighting modern crime with twenty-five-year-old tools that were used to fight Al Capone). 
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Several objective markers further illustrate the quaint state of federal criminal 
law in this era.  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would not be 
promulgated until 1940 and would not take effect until 1946.62  Before the 
enactment of the federal rules, federal criminal procedure was an inconsistent 
hodgepodge of local customs, state law derivations, and a patchwork of judicial 
rulemaking emanating from the Judiciary Act of 1789.63  Perhaps more 
remarkably, the Federal Rules of Evidence would not become law until 1975.64  
Additionally, the number of federal prosecutions was still relatively small and 
the FBI—the federal government’s main criminal investigative arm—was still 
in its relative adolescence and was generally reluctant to acknowledge the 
existence of nationwide organized crime and its ties to local public corruption.65  
Consequently, federal public corruption prosecutions of state and local officials 
were largely nonexistent.66 
Prohibition ended in 1933.67  The Prohibition experience created an 
environment that fostered national coordination of organized criminal activities, 
from bootlegging to distribution.68  This environment also encouraged rampant 
local public corruption when local prosecution of corruption was exposed as 
largely ineffective.69  At the same time, the Great Depression also cultivated a 
criminal cadre of desperados, some of whom briefly caught the national 
imagination and even popular support as mythic Robin Hood figures striking 
back against financial institutions and other perceived oppressors of the common 
man.70 
                                                     
 62. Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688 (codified in 18 U.S.C. app.).  The Supreme 
Court adopted the Rules in 1944, and the Rules took effect on March 21, 1946.  1 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEOPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1 (4th ed. 2012). 
 63. See George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 55 YALE L.J. 
694, 700 (1946) (describing the state of federal criminal procedure before 1946 as “chaotic”).  Some 
procedure matters were governed by “piecemeal legislation enacted at different times.”  Id.  Other 
matters were governed by common law.  Id. 
 64. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. Law No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1948–49 (1975) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. app. (2006 & Supp. V. 2012)).  
 65. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 31 (explaining that, even though the Department of 
Justice created an organized crime section in 1954, “individual members of the federal law 
enforcement establishment, particularly the FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover, scoffed at the idea that anything 
like a mafia existed in this country”). 
 66. See id. at 30. 
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing Prohibition). 
 68. See Nora V. Demleitner, Organized Crime and Prohibition: What Difference Does 
Legalization Make?, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 613, 622–24 (1994) (noting that Prohibition forced 
gangs “to collaborate to transport alcohol across state lines”). 
 69. See, e.g., JOHNSON, WOLFE & JONES, supra note 17, at 298 (explaining that local “police 
departments were drawn into the circle of criminal activity” and, because they “were encouraged 
to condone activities that violated prohibition laws, they took the expedient step and accepted bribes 
to cooperate fully with the underworld”). 
 70. See Jonathan Simon, Wechsler’s Century and Ours: Reforming Criminal Law in a Time 
of Shifting Rationalities of Government, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 247, 254 (2003) (explaining that, 
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In addition, advancements in automotive technology and the advent of the 
Thompson submachine gun provided an advantage to criminals, who, for a brief 
and chaotic time period between 1934 and 1936, outgunned and overwhelmed 
local law enforcement.71  However, local bank robberies and murders, in which 
the culprits were able to escape across state lines, were still viewed largely as 
problems for local law enforcement to solve.72  Nascent state extradition 
procedures and statewide criminal law enforcement apparatus were ineffective, 
and many local sheriffs were either bribed or were otherwise reluctant to assist 
law enforcement in other jurisdictions long as the criminal suspects broke no 
local laws while “laying low” in a sheriff’s particular jurisdiction.73 
The Hoover administration belatedly acknowledged this desperate state of 
affairs.74  This situation, coupled with the Prohibition legacy that spurred 
development of nationwide organized crime syndicates, was a disturbing new 
frontier for local law enforcement, as well as a challenge for the fledgling 
modern federal criminal law. 
This period was also marked by the FBI’s denial that there was a nationwide 
organized crime problem,75 coupled with the still-prevailing notion that this type 
                                                     
in the 1930s, “bank robbers like John Dillinger and Bonnie and Clyde emerged as national crime 
celebrities with broad and largely fawning national followings”). 
 71. BRYAN BURROUGH, PUBLIC ENEMIES: AMERICA’S GREATEST CRIME WAVE AND THE 
BIRTH OF THE FBI 16–17 (2004) (explaining that the increase in bank robberies in this era was a 
case of technology outstripping legal system; criminals were equipped with faster and more 
powerful weapons and cars powered with the newly developed V-8 engine, while local law 
enforcement was often left to respond with old inadequate weaponry and outdated hand-cranked 
Model A automobiles). 
 72. See Craig M. Bradley, Anti-Racketeering Legislation in America, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 
677 (2006) (asserting that Congress viewed crime as a problem for the states to solve). 
 73. See BURROUGH, supra note 71, at 206–07 (acknowledging significant turf battles and 
practical complexities in extraditing John Dillinger from Arizona to Indiana in 1934); GOLDFARB, 
supra note 2, at 35 (describing situations in which organized crime executives lived outside of the 
jurisdictions in which their criminal organizations operated so as to stymie local law enforcement).  
Attorney General RFK touched on related matters during his 1961 congressional testimony.  See 
The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 5 (1961) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. 
of the United States). 
 74. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 273 (noting that, in 1929, President Hoover “was the 
one to break the long silence” concerning the increase in crime). 
 75. See HERSH, supra note 11, at 42 (noting that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover “would 
flatfootedly deny that there was anything like organized crime out there”).  The FBI was still 
relatively new and heavily dependent on reporting favorable statistics in order to receive increased 
funding, and similarly heavily dependent on the assistance of local law enforcement to catch 
criminals.  Id.; SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 265.  Consequently, the FBI was reluctant to 
acknowledge a national organized crime problem for several decades.  See JOHNSON, WOLFE & 
JONES, supra note 27, at 299–300.  The FBI was similarly reluctant to assert jurisdiction over the 
notorious gangsters of the era.  See SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 265.  In succeeding decades, 
J. Edgar Hoover declined to investigate organized crime because he understood that such scrutiny 
would inevitably expose massive public corruption at the state and local level, which, in turn, would 
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of criminal activity was the responsibility of local law enforcement and thus 
outside of federal jurisdiction.76  It took John Dillinger’s brazen criminal 
antics—which included murder, bank robbery, and escape from a supposedly 
“escape-proof” local jail77—to finally attract presidential attention, which, in 
turn, finally spurred the FBI into action.78  FBI agents eventually killed Dillinger 
in Chicago in July of 1934, but only after the FBI reluctantly asserted 
jurisdiction, ostensibly because Dillinger violated the Dyer Act by driving a 
stolen car across state lines.79 
Bonnie and Clyde, two other notorious criminals of the era, also engaged in a 
brief but violent interstate robbery and murder spree that similarly did not attract 
much more than rhetorical federal interest.80  A Texas Ranger and a deputized 
posse tracked down Bonnie and Clyde in neighboring Louisiana, and eventually 
ambushed and killed them in a hail of gunfire; apparently the Texas Rangers did 
not feel constitutionally hamstrung by the crossing of state lines and other quaint 
notions of states’ rights and federalism that were in vogue at the time.81 
                                                     
compromise the assistance of local law enforcement.  See HERSH, supra note 11, at 42; 
SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 264–65, 950. 
 76. Even before the founding of the Republic, crime and public safety were core 
responsibilities of state and local governments.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (arguing that powers reserved to the states “extend to all the objects 
which . . . concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order . . . of the 
State”).  When Franklin Roosevelt was elected in 1932, many critics of the New Deal voiced classic 
Anti-Federalist objections, in addition to racist sentiments.  BURROUGH, supra note 71, at 14.  Some 
even went beyond classic Anti-Federalist principles and “viewed federal policing as the first step 
toward an American Gestapo.”  Id.; see also Bradley, supra note 72, at 677 (discussing the 1933 
Senate hearings in which “the overwhelming sentiment of the witnesses, federal and state officials 
. . . [thought that] crime should be dealt with by state, not federal authorities”); BURROUGH, supra 
note 71, at 59 (discussing role of expansive federal law enforcement to support New Deal policies). 
 77. HERSH, supra note 11, at 46–47. 
 78. BURROUGH, supra note 71, at 247–49. 
 79. See BURROUGH, supra note 71, at 249, 401–12 (discussing FBI’s eventual involvement 
in pursuit of Dillinger).  The Dyer Act prohibits the knowing transportation of a stolen vehicle 
across state lines.  18 U.S.C. § 2311 (2006).  Dillinger is generally thought to have participated in 
the robbery of at least two banks in Ohio and Indiana in the time between the enactment of the 
statute and his death two months later; however, he was never indicted by the federal government 
for those crimes.  See ELLIOT J. GORN, DILLINGER’S WILD RIDE 120–21 (2009); John Dillinger, 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases-john 
-dillinger (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
 80. BURROUGH, supra note 71, at 347 (asserting that Hoover “allowed an agent or two to 
track sightings of Bonnie and Clyde, but never treated the case seriously”). 
 81. Id. at 347–61.  Huge crowds attended Bonnie’s and Clyde’s funerals, which were held at 
separate locations.  Id. at 360.  The criminal duo achieved an even greater place in popular culture 
when heartthrobs Faye Dunaway and Warren Beatty portrayed them in the groundbreaking 1967 
film Bonnie and Clyde (Warner Bros. 1967).  Largely because of Dunaway’s portrayal, a seductive 
fascination with Bonnie Parker still exists.  See Rob Hunter, Hilary Duff to Reimagine ‘Bonnie and 
Clyde’ For Big Screen, FILM SCHOOL REJECTS (Jan. 27, 2009), 
http://www.filmschoolrejects.com/news/hilary-duff-to-reimagine-bonnie-and-clyde-on-the-big 
-screen.php (reporting that Hilary Duff is “[t]o [r]eimagine” the role of Bonnie Parker in a new 
adaptation of the story of Bonnie and Clyde); Kiran Pahwa, Miley Cyrus May Play Famous 
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As part of its New Deal policies to expand the role of the federal government, 
the Roosevelt administration devoted some energy to a federal war on crime.82  
However, during this period, many of the most successful prosecutions of 
organized crime figures were undertaken at the state level.  For example, New 
York prosecutor Thomas Dewey took advantage of then-novel state joinder 
provisions to convict the notorious Lucky Luciano and other underworld figures 
in 1936.83 
The most high-profile federal “gangster” prosecution of this era was that of 
the notorious Al Capone.  Capone was convicted on federal tax evasion charges 
in 1931.84  Criminal enforcement of the federal income tax laws served, 
essentially by default, as a main federal strategy to root out complex crime at a 
time when, owing to then-prevailing notions of federalism, federal prosecution 
of organized crime and public corruption was virtually non-existent.85  The 
enactment of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 does not suggest a contrary 
result.86   This statute, a precursor to the current Hobbs Act, was also passed as 
part of Congress’ reaction to the wave of violent crime of the early 1930s.87  
However, the Act was aimed largely at gangsters who, with the end of 
Prohibition, engaged in violent robberies of interstate shipments of goods and 
extorted from legitimate businesses.88 
                                                     
Criminal Bonnie Parker in New TV Miniseries, TOPNEWS (Oct. 1, 2012 12:31AM), 
http://www.topnews.in/light/miley-cyrus-may-play-famous-criminal-bonnie-parker-new-tv 
-miniseries-256865 (reporting that Miley Cyrus is in talks to play the role of Bonnie Parker in a 
proposed miniseries).  Recently, Parker’s .38 caliber Detective Special “that she had taped to her 
thigh when she was killed in 1934 sold for $264,000.”  Bonnie and Clyde’s Guns Fetch Big Bucks, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2012, at A2. 
 82. BURROUGH, supra note 71, at 14, 410. 
 83. See Lawrence Fleischer, Thomas E. Dewey and Earl Warren: The Rise of the Twentieth 
Century Urban Prosecutor, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 16–20 (1991) (discussing N.Y. District Attorney 
Thomas Dewey’s pivotal role in promulgating novel liberal joinder provisions, which were used to 
successfully prosecute Luciano and other members of the New York Mafia on broad conspiracy 
charges in 1936). 
 84. See JAY ALBANESE, ORGANIZED CRIME IN OUR TIMES 257–59 (6th ed. 2011); 
SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 283–85 (discussing the use of federal tax laws to convict Capone 
and noting that prosecutors used these tactics again in the 1960s). 
 85. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 283–85 (characterizing the prosecution of Al Capone 
for federal tax law violations as a major success of the Hoover administration).  Additionally: 
In early 1932, a large contingent of Treasury Department agents, acting on instructions 
from President Hoover, had been sent to Louisiana to investigate possible federal income 
tax violations by several members of the . . . administration [of Governor Huey Long].  
In this nascent “intangible rights” era, the common federal wisdom of the day was that 
local corruption, by itself, was not a federal crime. 
Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause As a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local 
Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 447 (1989). 
 86. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979, 979–80 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.  
§ 420e–1 (2006)). 
 87. See John S. Gawey, Note, The Hobbs Leviathan: The Dangerous Breadth of the Hobbs 
Act and Other Corruption Statutes, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 383, 389 (2011). 
 88. See Bradley, supra note 72, at 676; Gawey, supra note 87, at 391. 
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The statute contained cryptic “under color of official right” language that, 
decades later, would be relied on to authorize federal prosecution of state and 
local political corruption.89  Arguably, this language suggests that an avant-garde 
Seventy-Third Congress passed the statute to reach local political corruption and 
bribery.  However, this was almost certainly not the case.  Notably, in 1943, 
Representative Hobbs, the bill’s sponsor, indicated that the language was 
intended to reach the conduct of someone who coerced payment by 
impersonating a law enforcement officer.90  This conduct was a common form 
of extortion for “shaking down” shopkeepers and local merchants; a legislative 
justification a far cry from expanding federal criminal law jurisdiction to 
encompass more complex local political corruption and bribery.91  Indeed, the 
Hobbs Act would not be used to prosecute political corruption for more than 
three decades.92  
3.  The Fifties: Prelude to RFK 
In much the same way the 1950s—often portrayed as a placid, post-war lull 
between the end of World War II and the tumultuous sixties—was a necessary 
precursor for the transformative decade to come; specifically, the development 
of federal criminal law in the 1950s was a precursor to modern federal criminal 
law.93 
Although federal criminal law was still “behind the times” by the end of the 
1950s, some of the more fundamental changes to federal law enforcement 
practices began during this decade.  The Kefauver and McClellan Committee 
hearings brought organized crime into the national spotlight.94  The Kefauver 
Committee hearings transformed criminal justice into a national issue and, 
through television and modern media, exposed the limitations of state and local 
law enforcement in dealing effectively with the problem.95  As a result, in 1954, 
the Department of Justice formed an Organized Crime section.96  The Kefauver 
Committee reported that “a sinister criminal organization . . . [was] operating 
throughout the country” and that local law enforcement was ill equipped to fight 
organized interstate crime.97 
                                                     
 89. § 2, 48 Stat. at 980. 
 90. See Gawey, supra note 87, at 389–90 (explaining that Representative Hobbs intended the 
statute to include situations in which “you pretend to be a police officer, you pretend to be a deputy 
sheriff, but you are not”). 
 91. See id. (noting that the Hobbs Act was not used to prosecute political corruption for the 
first thirty years after its enactment). 
 92. See id. at 398–99. 
 93. See generally DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE FIFTIES ix (1993) (theorizing that, while pace 
of fifties often seemed “languid,” “social ferment was beginning, just beneath the surface”). 
 94. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 30 (describing the hearings as “publicized”) 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (noting that the Justice Department’s first section devoted to organized crime was 
“small and ineffective”). 
 97. Id. 
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At its inception, the Organized Crime section was small, reactive, inadequate, 
and lacking in essential coordination efforts, but it was a start.98  However, it 
was also emblematic of the Eisenhower administration’s ultimate lack of 
genuine commitment to pursue aggressively organized crime and political 
corruption as federal prosecutorial priorities, as well as indicative of a lack of 
imagination to conceive of a broader and more effective federal criminal 
jurisdiction.99 
In 1957, the McClellan, or Rackets, Committee hearings—of which newly 
minted attorney Robert F. Kennedy played a prominent role as chief counsel 
—further exposed corruption and organized crime ties to organized labor and 
emphasized the inherent inadequacy of state law enforcement efforts.100  This 
resulted in passage of some federal anti-labor union corruption legislation.101 
In November of 1957, in Apalachin, New York, law enforcement 
inadvertently stumbled upon a large meeting of crime syndicate figures from all 
over the country.102  Although all of the federal conspiracy convictions arising 
out of the Apalachin events were ultimately reversed on appeal,103 even a 
reluctant FBI director J. Edgar Hoover could no longer credibly maintain his flat 
denial of the existence of “organized crime.”104 
In 1957, the Civil Rights Division was created within the Department of 
Justice.105  At the same time, President Eisenhower appointed federal judges 
within the Fifth Circuit who were tasked with the trench warfare-like judicial 
                                                     
 98. Id. at 30–31 (describing the job of the members of the Special Group on Organized Crime 
as “unenviable”). 
 99. In the last year of the Eisenhower administration, Attorney General William Rogers wrote 
a self-laudatory article in Parade Magazine entitled “The New War on Organized Crime,” which 
was entered into the Congressional Record by Republican Senator Keating of New York on 
February 8, 1960.  106 CONG. REC. 2159–60 (1960) (statement of Sen. Keating).  However, even 
Senator Keating acknowledged that, despite the work of the Justice Department, “we are losing 
ground in the war against crime because of our failure to up-date the existing laws in the field.  We 
have been attempting to cope with 20th century criminal techniques with the backward methods 
and obsolete laws of yesteryear.”  Id. at 2159. 
 100. GOLDFARB, supra note 11, at 163 (explaining that RFK’s efforts to combat corruption 
prompted local authorities in some areas to do the same); HERSH, supra note 11, at 147 (describing 
RFK’s attempt to expose corruption); SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 168–69 (emphasizing RFK’s 
role in the hearings). 
 101. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 183–85 (detailing labor legislation passed as a result 
of the Rackets Committee’s work). 
 102. See ALBANESE, supra note 84, at 141–44.  The prosecution’s theory of the case to support 
the “conspiracy to obstruct justice” charges was based on the attendees’ failure to disclose the 
purpose of the meeting.  Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. JOHNSON, WOLFE & JONES, supra note 27, at 299–300; see also HERSH, supra note 11, 
at 198–99 (discussing Hoover’s “Top Hoodlum Program”); SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 264 
(mentioning Hoover’s initial “indifference to organized crime”). 
 105. Peyton McCrary, How the Voting Rights Act Works: Implementation of a Civil Rights 
Policy, 1965-2005, 57 S.C. L. REV. 785, 787 (2006) (noting that the Civil Rights Division had the 
authority to “bring constitutional challenge to barriers on minority voting”). 
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implementation of the desegregation of southern schools in the aftermath of the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954.106 
Nevertheless, as the decade came to a close, “crime” had not yet become a 
common and perennial political issue on the national stage, even after the 
increased public attention as a result of the sensational televised Rackets 
hearings.107  The entrenched structure of congressional power at the time served 
to reinforce this state of affairs.  Autocratic and largely segregationist Southern 
Democrats dominated Congress, and they, by virtue of the power of seniority 
and the committee system, routinely blocked progressive legislation in the name 
of states’ rights, including some legislation seeking to expand the federal police 
power.108  This states’ rights federalism and correlative rhetorical fear of a 
national police force was as old as the Republic, and it hindered the modern 
evolution of federal criminal law enforcement.109  This was the lay of the land 
when John F. Kennedy narrowly won the presidency in 1960. 
                                                     
 106. See DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 18–24 (1988). 
 107. In 1964, Barry Goldwater briefly alluded to crime as a looming national issue in his 
acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 274.  
However, it was left to Richard Nixon to transform a “war on crime” into a national political issue 
in his 1968 presidential campaign.  See RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND 202 (Scribner ed. 2009).  
Nixon focused on a perceived breakdown of law and order reflected by unbridled physical violence 
and riots in the streets and he further claimed that the Supreme Court favored criminals.  Id.  In a 
1968 article, Nixon and his speechwriters noted that “the symptoms are everywhere and manifest: 
in the public attitude toward police, in the mounting traffic in illicit drugs, in the volume of teenage-
arrests, in campus disorders and the growth of white collar crime. . . . Far from becoming a great 
society, ours is becoming a lawless society.”  Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
Narcotics offenses and white collar and public corruption cases would dominated federal criminal 
dockets in the following decades.  Id. at 266. 
 108. See THE CONCISE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY  
288–89 (Michael Kazin ed. 2011) (discussing the dominance of Southern Democrats in the 
congressional committee system from New Deal through the 1960s); see also KATZNELSON, supra 
note 54, at 193–94 (explaining the complex relationship where Southern Democratic legislators 
would support the progressive policies of New Deal only if it did not affect racial segregation). 
 109. See JOHNSON, WOLFE & JONES, supra note 27, at 254 (“[F]rom its inception as a nation, 
many Americans had opposed the creation of a national police force, fearing that such a 
centralization of in the hands of the federal government would lead to the sort of abuses perpetrated 
by European monarchies and dictatorships.”); see also HERSH, supra note 11, at 81 (noting the 
growth of FBI under President Roosevelt and the accompanying fear that FBI would “morph into 
a National Police Force”).  These concerns were still present during the 1970s and 1980s as various 
comprehensive federal criminal law reform efforts were ultimately unsuccessful.  See Kurland, 
supra note 85, at 419 n.189, 421 n.199 (citing sources that discuss the recurring theme of the fear 
of a national police force as undermining reform efforts to modernize Federal Criminal Code). 
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II.  THE RFK JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND THE CONTEMPORARY WAVE OF 
MODERN FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
A.  President Kennedy Appoints RFK as Attorney General 
President Kennedy’s appointment of his thirty-five-year-old brother as 
attorney general was controversial on several fronts.  Despite RFK’s experience 
as a chief counsel in the federal Rackets Committee hearings in the 1950s, RFK 
was criticized for his lack of legal experience.110  Indeed, the only senator to 
oppose his nomination lambasted his professional inexperience, including that 
he had never litigated a civil case.111  Some critics also condemned the 
appointment as blatant nepotism.112 
When RFK was confirmed as attorney general in early 1961, federal criminal 
law was not in its infancy.  Nonetheless, RFK took office at a time at which the 
relationship between federal and state criminal law authority mirrored the 
tumultuous and transformative times of the civil rights movement.  As the 
decade unfolded, the relationship between federal authority and the states 
changed fundamentally and ushered in the modern reordering structure that 
exists today.  However, at the dawn of the decade, evolving federal and national 
priorities were, in many ways, generally not recognized or were otherwise 
ignored.  Local mores and customs—whether in the form of racial discrimination 
or in the acquiescance in actions or inactions of local public officials, both 
related and unrelated to organized crime—often seriously impeded efforts to 
create and implement federal policy.113 
The presidential election of 1960 foreshadowed much of this tension between 
the federal government and the states.  By most calculations, President Kennedy 
narrowly won the majority of the popular vote over Richard Nixon, but won a 
comfortable majority in the Electoral College.114  Segregationist Southern 
                                                     
 110. See 107 CONG. REC. 1027, 1028–30 (1961) (statement of Sen. Allot) (criticizing RFK for 
his youth and inexperience). 
 111. Id. at 1029. 
 112. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 229–30. 
 113. See, e.g., GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 34 (discussing public disillusionment and cynicism 
where citizenry realizes that the criminal “syndicate’s tentacles inevitably [have] reached public 
officials who [are] . . . co-opted from enforcing the laws in order for [the] syndicates to operate 
flagrantly”); SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 294–95 (noting that the white South ignored the 
Supreme Court’s decision 1960 to desegregate train and bus terminals). 
 114. Kennedy won the electoral vote over Richard Nixon by 303 to 219; the remaining votes 
were for segregationist Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia.  THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF 
THE PRESIDENT 1960, at 350 (1961).  Determining Kennedy’s popular vote total was problematic 
because  Alabama listed only the names of the individual electors, not the presidential candidates, 
on the ballot.  EDWARD F. KALLINA, JR., KENNEDY V. NIXON: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 
1960, at 192–93 (2010).  The Democratic elector with greatest number of votes did not support 
Kennedy, and it is therefore generally considered impossible to accurately determine Kennedy’s 
statewide vote total in Alabama.  Id.  The Democratic slate in Alabama split their electoral votes: 
Kennedy received five electoral votes, and Harry F. Bird received six electoral votes.  Id. at 188.  
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Democrats, who had opposed the civil rights planks in the Democratic Party’s 
platform, assembled “independent” slates of electors in some states who were 
not pledged to support Kennedy.115  Several of these “irregular” electors were 
victorious in Mississippi and Alabama, and ultimately cast their Electoral 
College votes for segregationist Senator Harry F. Byrd.116 
President Kennedy supported the strong civil rights plank in the 1960 
Democratic Party platform.117  Nevertheless, after the Kennedy administration 
took office in 1961, RFK’s Justice Department was not initially a primary 
catalyst of the civil rights movement.118  However, as events unfolded outside 
of the administration’s control, RFK’s Department ultimately played a 
significant role in what would become America’s “Second Reconstruction,”119 
which included sending in federal troops to assure the enrollment of James 
Meredith at the University of Mississippi.120  Although the RFK Justice 
Department’s role in the civil rights movement was not wholly unrelated to the 
expansion of federal criminal law enforcement in this era, for present purposes, 
it is sufficient to recognize that the assertion of federal authority—backed by 
force where necessary—coupled with the sober recognition that education and 
public acceptance of federal jurisdiction was essential, paved the way for greater 
and more effective enforcement of and compliance with federal law.121 
B.  Segregation and Racism in the South Foster States’ Rights Ideology 
The brothers Kennedy understood the eye of the tumultuous storm into which 
they were sailing.  As the sixties dawned, many of the segregationist states’ 
rights forces that controlled Congress had spent the better part of seven decades 
impeding the development of a more modern, expansive, and centralized federal 
government, which included strong suspicion and frequent opposition to the 
                                                     
Accordingly, Nixon may have actually won the popular vote because the nationwide vote total was 
so close.  Id. at 192–93 & 253 n.37–38. 
 115. See KALLINA, supra note 114, at 188. 
 116. KALLINA, supra note 114, at 188 (noting that, in what was generally considered an upset, 
an entire independent slate of electors won in Mississippi, and all eight cast their electoral votes for 
Senator Byrd).  Although the “Solid Democratic South” had eroded with the Eisenhower landslides 
of 1952 and 1956, Democratic presidential candidates still relied on support from the states of the 
old Confederacy.  Id. at 11. 
 117. KALLINA, supra note 114, at 139–40; SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 215–16 (noting 
RFK’s enthusiasm with regard to the strong civil rights plank). 
 118. SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 286–89. 
 119. Acclaimed Southern historian C. Vann Woodward first coined the term “Second 
Reconstruction.”  C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE HISTORY OF JIM CROW 8–10 
(commemorative ed. 2002).  “Second Reconstruction” refers to the time period spanning from the 
end of World War II to the 1960s.  See generally MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND 
REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND IN BLACK AMERICA (3d. ed. 2007) 
(tracking the major civil rights movements that made up the Second Reconstruction). 
 120. SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 317–27. 
 121. For a discussion of the relationship between the civil rights movement and the 
modernization of federal criminal law, see SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 293–95. 
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expansion of federal criminal law enforcement.122  The virulent and largely 
Southern opposition to an expanded federal police power and to the Kennedy 
administration itself was, not surprisingly, most starkly exemplified in the area 
of civil rights enforcement.123 
Arguably, RFK had built up a reservoir of political good will with the white 
South after his Rackets Committee performance.124  However, any carry-over 
effect was uncertain at best.  The political opposition to modernization efforts—
particularly new initiatives to expand federal criminal jurisdiction 
—consisted of, in not insubstantial part, powerful conservative Southern 
Democrats who, with civil rights issues moving to the forefront, no longer 
constituted a reliable so-called “Solid Democratic South.”125   
On May 17, 1961, RFK left his office at the Department of Justice building at 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue and headed eastward for the short one-mile trip to the 
United States Capitol to testify before Congress in support of his anti-crime 
package.126  On that pleasant spring day, RFK stepped out into a city that lacked 
home rule and was governed, in effect, by the white Southern congressmen who 
controlled the House Committee on the District of Columbia.127  Additionally, 
although the situation had marginally improved under the Eisenhower 
administration, the District of Columbia was still, in many ways, a typical, 
segregated Southern city of the era.128    
Glancing northeastward from the Main Justice Department Building, slightly 
more than two miles in the distance, sat old Griffith Stadium, now the present 
                                                     
 122. Wallace, supra note 52, at 8 (explaining that, although the South generally opposed the 
expansion of criminal law because of segregationist ideology, the same racist policy was 
responsible for Southern support of the Mann Act and several federal drug crime statutes); see also 
BURROUGH, supra note 71, at 14 (discussing the nexus between Southern racism and the fear of 
federal law enforcement expansion); DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING 
MORALITY AND THE MANN ACT 42–43 (1909) (noting that the Southern opposition to the Mann 
Act was based on states’ rights grounds); WOFFORD, supra note 10, at 94 (noting that the Kennedy 
administration immediately recognized the challenges of working with Senator Eastland of 
Mississippi, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee). 
 123. NAVASKY, supra note 11, at 165–91 (reproducing several transcripts of conversations 
between Governor Barnett of Mississippi and RFK concerning efforts to enroll James Meredith at 
the University of Mississippi).  At times, Governor Barnett refused to acknowledge the authority 
of federal court orders and suggested that Mississippi was not part of the United States.  Id. at 188–
90.  Earlier, Governor Barnett appeared on statewide television and proclaimed that “[w]e will not 
surrender to the evil and illegal forces of tyranny.”  SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 318. 
 124. SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 188. 
 125. See KALLINA, supra note 114, at 188. 
 126. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 45 (noting that RFK testified before Congress on May 
17, 1961 in support of comprehensive federal criminal law legislation). 
 127. See THOMAS G. SMITH, SHOWDOWN: JFK AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE WASHINGTON 
REDSKINS 134–39 (2011) (reviewing the local governance of Washington, D.C. in 1960). 
 128. See id. at 139 (noting that D.C. had  persistent de facto segregation problems in 1960, 
including continued illegal invocation of racial housing covenants, racial exclusions at elite private 
clubs, exclusion of black participants from an event at the Mayflower Hotel, and few black 
policemen or firemen). 
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site of Howard University Hospital.  A few weeks earlier, President Kennedy 
had thrown out the first ball at Griffith Stadium as part of the new Washington 
Senators’ 1961 Opening Day festivities.129   The original Senators franchise, a 
charter member of the American League dating back to 1903, had moved to 
Minnesota after the 1960 season.  Their owner was an avowed racist who later 
proudly acknowledged that he moved his club to Minnesota “when [he] found 
out [Minnesota] only had 15,000 black people here.”130 
Two miles directly behind the Capitol Building, a modern sports stadium to 
house the local professional baseball and football teams was under construction.  
The local professional football scene, on both the racial and competitive fronts, 
was not much different.  The Washington Redskins of the National Football 
League, like the old Senators, were one of the worst teams in their league.131  In 
addition, Redskins’ owner George Preston Marshall was another avowed racist 
and the last NFL owner to integrate his team in 1962.132  
These geographical and sociopolitical sports factoids could not have escaped 
RFK, and, in fact, were of considerable consequence to the new 
administration.133  For example, the Redskins integrated only after Secretary of 
the Interior Stewart Udall, in March, 1961, just months after President 
Kennedy’s inauguration, threatened to prevent Marshall from moving his team 
into the new publically owned stadium until Marshall integrated his team.134  
                                                     
 129. BRAD SNYDER, BEYOND THE SHADOW OF THE SENATORS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE 
HOMESTEAD GRAYS AND THE INTEGRATION OF BASEBALL 288 (2003). 
 130. See id. at 288–89. 
 131. The Redskins had not participated in an NFL championship game since 1945, had not had 
a winning season since 1955, and were coming off a 1-9-2 season in 1960.  SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
ALMANAC 2013 115–16 (NFL standings from 1956–1960).  The Redskins would follow up with a 
league worst 1-12-1 record in 1961.  Id. 
 132. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 127, at 1, 127 (describing Marshall as a “bigoted Southerner” 
and a “racist and a scourge on the game”). 
 133. See id. at 160; infra note 134 and accompanying text (noting JFK and RFK supported 
Interior Secretary’s Udall’s position to bar Redskins from playing in new stadium unless team 
integrated).  This was not an entirely new situation for RFK.  While playing varsity football at 
Harvard in 1947, RFK agreed with a prospective team boycott against playing a scheduled game 
against the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia.  Virginia had voiced objections about 
whether Chester Pierce, an African American tackle on the Harvard team, could participate in the 
game.  No black player had ever played against a Southern university in the South.  The entire 
Harvard team agreed to not play unless every player received equal treatment.  SCHLESINGER, supra 
note 10, at 68.  With all hands on deck, Harvard lost the game 47-0.  See EZRA E. H. GRIFFITH, 
RACE AND EXCELLENCE 32 (1998).  The University of Virginia would not integrate its 
intercollegiate football team until 1970.  CHARLES MARTIN, BENCHING JIM CROW: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF THE COLOR LINE IN SOUTHERN COLLEGE SPORTS, 1890–1990, at 148 (2010). 
 134. See SMITH, supra note 127, at vii–viii, 149–71; SNYDER, supra note 129, at 198–99.  The 
new Stadium was christened “D.C. Stadium” but was later renamed “RFK Stadium.”  Id. 
Although Major League Baseball had been integrated in 1947, the integration process proceeded 
slowly.  In October 1964, less than a year after President Kennedy’s assassination, the World Series 
featured a clash of the two baseball cultures: the predominantly white New York Yankees, teetering 
at the end of their dynasty, and the upstart St. Louis Cardinals, representing the new era, who 
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Udall’s Interior Department had jurisdiction over the new stadium because it 
was built on federal land in the District of Columbia.  It was a small, but 
significant principled stand for proactive federal involvement.  The new 
administration would take an even more profound stand for proactive federal 
involvement in the area of federal criminal law. 
C.  RFK Advocates for the Expansion of Federal Criminal Law 
On May 25, 1961, the United States entered the space age when President 
Kennedy addressed Congress to garner support for a national commitment to 
land “a man on the moon and return[] him safely to the earth” before the end of 
the decade.135   Eight days earlier, Attorney General RFK had presented his 
organized crime package to Congress.136  The juxtaposition of the 
administration’s two significant challenges was striking, as they were literally 
worlds apart. 
When President Kennedy took office, federal criminal law was still 
shockingly rudimentary and inadequate.  However, several forces were already 
in motion that would make significant change possible.  It took a visionary, 
energetic, and impatient attorney general to shape and usher in the new era, 
especially with regard to organized crime, public corruption, and the expansion 
of federal criminal jurisdiction. 
1.  Proposals to Modernize Federal Criminal Law 
As attorney general, RFK sought to aggressively take  advantage of the tools 
already at his disposal, such as utilizing violations of the federal tax laws to 
prosecute organized crime figures.137  However, tax prosecutions were not 
                                                     
featured black stars such as Bob Gibson, Lou Brock, and Curt Flood.  For a thorough analysis, see 
DAVID HALBERSTAM, OCTOBER 1964 (1995).  In Baltimore, less than forty miles up Interstate 95 
from Washington, D.C., similar social themes continued to resonate on and off the field.  The 
socially schizophrenic nature of Baltimore has been evident since at least Civil War times, when 
President Lincoln had to send Union troops to the city help ensure that Maryland did not secede 
from the Union.  The “paradoxical” nature of the city is aptly described by my colleague Professor 
Harold McDougall, who has noted that Baltimore is the “southernmost city of the North, and the 
northernmost city of the South.”  HAROLD MCDOUGALL, BLACK BALTIMORE 1 (1993).  In 1966, 
black superstar Frank Robinson won the Triple Crown and led the Baltimore Orioles to their first 
World Series title.  However, Robinson, a widely recognized and largely idolized sports hero who 
had been traded to Baltimore before the 1966 season, was unable to obtain suitable housing in the 
Baltimore suburbs.  See TOM ADELMAN, BLACK AND BLUE: SANDY KOUFAX, THE ROBINSON 
BOYS, AND THE WORLD SERIES THAT STUNNED AMERICA 11 (2006). 
 135. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Special Message to the Congress on 
Urgent National Needs (May 25, 1961), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb 
.edu/ws/?pid=8151#axzz2jLwdv5Rl. 
 136. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 45 (describing RFK’s testimony in support of his  
anti-crime package before the House Judiciary Committee on May 17, 1961). 
 137. See id. at 48 (discussing the role of the IRS in criminal investigations and prosecuting 
organized crime). 
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nearly enough.  RFK recognized that broad new strategies were essential.  In 
The Enemy Within, he explained: 
The methods of our law enforcement agencies have not kept pace with 
the improved techniques of today’s criminals.  We are still trying to 
fight the modern Al Capone with the weapons that we used twenty-
five years ago, they simply are not effective.  And the result is that 
within ten years our whole economy will be drastically affected.  I 
think that there are steps that can and should be taken to deal with the 
problem.138 
Now he would get his chance.  RFK and his aides rapidly constructed a key 
crime package—with eight substantive and procedural proposals—to modernize 
federal criminal law enforcement.139  RFK arrived at the Capitol on that May 
morning in 1961 to personally argue in support of his department’s proposed 
legislation. 
RFK’s ambitious crime proposals evinced his interest in transforming federal 
criminal law enforcement into a tool through which to prosecute all aspects of 
organized crime, as well as to adapt federal criminal law enforcement to modern 
realities of white collar crime, corporate crime, and public corruption.140  
Undoubtedly, RFK’s intense personal interest derived, in part, from his 
obsession with prosecuting and convicting Teamster’s leader Jimmy Hoffa.141  
Indeed, RFK assembled an informal “get Hoffa” squad within the Justice 
Department and cherry-picked trusted criminal investigators from other federal 
agencies, as an end run around recalcitrant FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.142 
The RFK Justice Department focused on the larger picture as well.  RFK was 
not afraid to expressly acknowledge that local authorities could not successfully 
prosecute many aspects of modern crime, given its complexities and interstate 
nature.  He made clear that he intended to do something to rectify this untenable 
situation.143  Despite the bravado of the televised Rackets Hearings of the prior 
decade, the modernization of federal criminal law had been largely ignored for 
more than a quarter-century. 
This changed with the proposal of the Travel Act and several other federal 
criminal law and procedure proposals to modernize federal criminal law 
                                                     
 138. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 263–64. 
 139. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 45 (describing RFK’s proposed legislation); 
SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 268 (same). 
 140. See, e.g., Gawey, supra note 87, at 398–99 & n.96 (recognizing RFK’s vigorous  
trail-blazing efforts to prosecute local organized crime and corruption in the early 1960s); see also 
GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 40 (noting RFK’s willingness to advocate for additional laws when 
needed). 
 141. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 55 (describing RFK’s disdain for “crooked unions” and 
his belief that Hoffa was a “thug”). 
 142. See id. at 65; see also HERSH, supra note 11, at 213–14, 258–59. 
 143. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 37 (noting RFK’s desire to reform and enforce federal 
criminal law). 
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enforcement.  The RFK Justice Department proposed new legislation to prohibit 
interstate travel in aid of racketeering (the Travel Act),144 expand the fugitive 
felon law,145 prohibit the use of interstate facilities and interstate shipment of 
materials for gambling purposes,146 expand federal immunity provisions to cover 
labor investigations,147 in addition to various witness protection proposals.148  
With the exception of the immunity and witness protection proposals, all were 
enacted in substantially the same form as the Justice Department proposals.149 
The two most significant proposals were the Travel Act, which was new, and 
the immunity provisions, which modified earlier proposals by the Eisenhower 
administration.150  These two proposals exemplify the modern thrust of the RFK 
Justice Department.  The Travel Act was the most significant because it sought 
to expand substantially the reach of federal criminal jurisdiction and placed the 
prosecution of local political corruption within the ambit of federal law 
enforcement. 
The proposed crime package was considered to have bipartisan support 
because the previous Republican administration had endorsed many of the 
provisions.151  However, the proposals that sought to recast the scope of federal 
jurisdiction were troublesome at the outset.  Even before RFK had uttered his 
first word before Congress, critics and supporters alike were concerned about 
the potential problems of legislation that created federal crimes that substantially 
overlapped with state criminal jurisdiction.152 
                                                     
 144. S. 1653, 87th Cong. (1st Sess. 1961) (original version of the Travel Act); Act of Sept. 13, 
1961, Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (1961) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006)) 
(enacting the Travel Act). 
 145. Act of Oct. 4, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-368, 75 Stat. 795 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 
(2006)). 
 146. Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No 87-216, 75 Stat. 491 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1084 
(2006)). 
 147. S. 1665, 87th Cong. (1st Sess. 1961). 
 148. Id. 
 149. For a comprehensive and critical view of the federal government’s “spurious” expansion 
of federal criminal law enforcement in these matters, see Bradley, supra note 76, at 681. 
 150. See Legislation Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 200–01 (statement of Rep. Herbert Zelenko) (discussing the 
incorporation of legislation originally introduced in 1954). 
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 152. For example, House Subcommittee Chairman Emanuel Celler ominously intoned that: 
Wherever there is an expansion of Federal criminal jurisdiction as an auxiliary to State 
law enforcement a studied and deliberate approach to such expansion is most necessary. 
. . .  Many of these organized crimes are local problems and, thus, to expand Federal 
jurisdiction over them would create many new difficulties. . . .  Federal administrative 
problems may arise.  There may be a tendency to weaken local enforcement efforts due 
to Federal intervention.  There is the serious problem also of the anomalies arising out of 
dual jurisdiction, such as dual prosecution-Federal and State-for the same crime, the 
question of immunity, the filing of detainers, the disparity of sentencing. 
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a.  The Travel Act 
The Travel Act was the centerpiece of the RFK Justice Department’s criminal 
law proposals.  In support of the Travel Act, RFK testified that “hoodlums and 
racketeers . . . in many instances have become so rich and so powerful that they 
have outgrown local authorities.”153  He also noted that the main crimes 
encompassed in the Act, “gambling, liquor violations, narcotics, bribery and 
corruption of local officials and labor racketeering and extortion go hand in 
hand,” and that the huge profits from these activities could be used to bribe 
public officials on seemingly unrelated matters.154  Additionally, RFK 
recognized that the proposed law, applied in conjunction with federal aiding and 
abetting principles, provided a potent new weapon to reach kingpins of 
organized crime who often lived far from the scene and otherwise may have not 
committed any crime in the state where they lived.155 
A few weeks later, RFK testified before the Senate Judiciary committee that 
“[o]ur investigations . . . have made it quite clear that only the Federal 
Government can shut off the funds which permit the top men of organized crime 
to live far from the scene and, therefore, remain immune from the local 
officials.”156  He further emphasized that “federal legislation was needed to aid 
state and local governments which were no longer able to cope with the 
increasingly complex and interstate nature of large scale multi-party crime.”157 
RFK’s assertion that some types of crime generally thought to be the province 
of state and local law enforcement could not be prosecuted effectively by state 
and local authorities was the most significant recognition of the state of criminal 
law by a high ranking administration official in more than a quarter century.158  
RFK recognized that the federal government had the responsibility to use its’ 
power to regulate interstate commerce aggressively and creatively.159  
                                                     
Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Celler).  Celler was a Democrat from New York, who also expressed 
concerns that the above practical problems would be eclipsed by even more serious civil liberties 
concerns.  See id. 
 153. Id. at 19 (statement of Attorney General Kennedy). 
 154. Id. at 19–20 (statement of Attorney General Kennedy). 
 155. Id. at 21–22. 
 156. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 16 (1961) (statement of Attorney General 
Kennedy). 
 157. Id. at 11 (statement of Attorney General Kennedy). 
 158. President Herbert Hoover noted “crime is increasing” in his 1929 inaugural address and 
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Kennedy). 
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Contemporary law enforcement challenges were far more complex than the mere 
crossing of a state line, and simply addressing some of the underlying 
problems—such as the speed of automobiles used to cross state lines during the 
commission of a crime—was no longer an adequate response. 
The Travel Act still “safely” used the “crossing of a state line statutory 
formula,”160 but it was far more innovative, subtle, complex, and far reaching.161  
Professor Craig Bradley has recognized that the Travel Act “was the most 
significant both in terms of expansion of federal jurisdiction and subsequent use 
by the [federal] government as a prosecutorial tool.”162  Likewise, in their 
leading contemporary Federal Criminal Law casebook, Professors Abrams, 
Beale, and Klein observe: 
The Travel Act, enacted in 1961, was innovative in a number of 
respects. It relied on the commerce power to make criminal not just 
one but a number of major categories of crime heretofore only made 
criminal under state law. It utilized for the first time the technique of 
incorporating state crimes directly into a specific federal criminal 
statute where the conduct had some link to commerce.  It adopted an 
expansive approach to the type of crime-related deeds to be covered 
by the Act.  It also adopted an expansive approach to the commerce 
connection, requiring interstate movement but covering all forms 
thereof, including the absorption of the use of the mails into the 
commerce base. 
The Travel Act can be viewed as the direct forerunner of the modern 
complex and organizational crime statutes: RICO, the illegal gambling 
business statute, and the continuing criminal enterprise statute.  It was 
                                                     
 160. S. 1653, 87th Cong. (1st Sess. 1961) (original version of the Travel Act) (including the 
prefatory language “[w]hoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to” commit a 
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 162. Bradley, supra note 76, at 681.  Note the jurisdictional breadth of the statute works in two 
significant ways: (1) the underlying predicate violations broaden the substantive reach, and (2) the 
use of mails or an interstate facility confers federal jurisdiction even in the absence of actual 
physical interstate travel.  Id. 
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the first federal criminal statute that contained the principle 
components of complex crime—that is, it expressly included multiple 
other crimes among its elements.  Because the Travel Act incorporated 
into its terms crimes defined by reference to state law, the scope of the 
statute was to be determined in part by the breadth of interpretation 
given to such “state law” terms.163 
Significantly, the Travel Act expressly included both federal and state law 
bribery as an underlying predicate act element, so the statute had a clear nexus 
to local public corruption to a degree not previously found in any federal 
criminal statute.164  Thus, the Travel Act was the critical step in positioning the 
federal government to effectively prosecute local political corruption and to 
pursue it as a substantial federal prosecutorial priority. 
RFK himself recognized the significance of the Travel Act, frankly noting in 
his congressional testimony that the Act was “[t]he most controversial and 
certainly one of the most important” of the proposals in his crime package.165  In 
addition, in his first Attorney General’s Annual Report to Congress for fiscal 
year 1961, coming on the heels of the passage of most of his crime package, 
RFK took the opportunity to proudly compare his legislative achievements 
against the classic 1934 benchmark.  He noted that “more anti-crime legislation 
was enacted during [the past legislative session] than in any period since 1934,” 
and that the newly enacted Travel Act “proscribe[d] certain types of illicit 
activity never before governed by federal law.”166  RFK further noted that  “these 
laws are aimed at the nation-wide ramifications of crime which make it an 
extremely lucrative business . . . and that [t]he new statutes enable the federal 
                                                     
 163. ABRAMS, BEALE & KLEIN, supra note 33, at 71. 
 164. Attorney General Kennedy understood that having the Travel Act reach federal and state 
law bribery without limitation was necessary to effectively prosecute local corruption.  See Breen, 
supra note 4, at 16 (noting that the Travel Act is one of the only tools with which the federal 
government could reach “ordinary crime”).  During the congressional deliberations concerning the 
Travel Act, Congress sought to limit the bribery provisions by requiring that bribery be connected 
to prostitution, gambling, liquor or narcotics.  See H.R. REP. No. 87-966.  This would have left the 
Travel Act far less effective in combatting public corruption.  Id.  The Department of Justice 
strongly objected, and the original, broad DOJ language was ultimately included in the law.  See 
Breen, supra note 4, at 138 n.95; see also Gawey, supra note 87 at 389–90; Charles Ruff, Federal 
Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making  of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. 
L.J. 1171, 1172, 1174–75 & nn. 2, 10–14 (1977) (recognizing that Kennedy sponsored anti-
racketeering laws in 1961 as “readily identifiable mileposts” in federal government’s ramped up 
efforts to prosecute state and local corruption and further asserting that the Hobbs Act’s eventual 
utility to prosecute local corruption was largely a judicial adaptation and not based on original 
legislative intent). 
 165. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 15 (1961) (statement of Attorney General 
Kennedy). 
 166. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1961, at 9 (1961). 
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government to bring to bear on the social evil the highly coordinated and 
concentrated power of all of the Federal enforcement agencies.”167 
RFK’s comprehensive crime package served notice that federal criminal law 
enforcement was no longer reactive,168 and would greatly increase the 
prosecutorial discretion of federal prosecutors.169  This, in turn, would require 
the further promulgation, subject to constant review and revision, of detailed and 
publically available policy guidelines to aid federal prosecutors in exercising 
their broader discretion.170  This begat the world of proactive federal prosecution 
we know today, with guidance in the form of publically available—but not 
judicially enforceable—comprehensive prosecutorial guidelines, including the 
“Principles of Federal Prosecution.”171 
Similarly, because of the expanding overlap of criminal conduct under both 
state and federal law, the new federal criminal law framework would also require 
constant revision of the Petite Policy, which originally emanated from a brief 
1959 press release from RFK’s immediate predecessor, William Rogers.  The 
Petite Policy provides general guidance to federal prosecutors in determining 
whether a successive prosecution is warranted where substantial federal interests 
                                                     
 167. See id. at 10.  RFK also referenced the 1934 benchmark in his earlier congressional 
testimony. See May 1961 House Hearings, supra note 151, at 28–29 (statement of Attorney General 
Kennedy). 
 168. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 48 (discussing RFK’s proactive model of  
action-oriented law enforcement led by prosecutors); Robert F. Kennedy, JOHN F. KENNEDY 
PRESIDENTIAL MUSEUM AND LIBRARY, http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/The-Kennedy 
-Family/Robert-F-Kennedy.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (noting the RFK Justice Department’s 
eight hundred percent increase in prosecutions and convictions of organized crime figures 
compared to previous the administration). 
 169. See Breen, supra note 4, at 125–30 (discussing the breadth of the Travel Act). 
 170. See Leland E. Beck, The Administrative Law of Criminal Prosecution: The Development 
of Prosecutorial Policy, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 310, 337–56 (1978); see also Norman Abrams, Internal 
Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971); Schwartz, 
supra note 23, at 77 (noting the Department of Justice’s then-novel practice, circa 1948, of 
promulgating basic prosecutorial discretion “standing [i]nstructions” to all U.S. attorneys, which, 
at the time, were only circulated within the Department of Justice); Wayne R. LaFave, The 
Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 537–38 (1970) (lamenting 
past practices of largely unstructured prosecutor’s decision on when to prosecute and recognizing 
the need for promulgation of established standards on exercise of prosecutorial discretion).  
Notably, Professor LaFave cited favorably to The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 1, 33–34 (1967), which, 
authored just a few years after the RFK transformation of federal criminal justice, strongly endorsed 
the promulgation of established prosecutorial standards. 
 171. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.000 
(1997) [hereinafter U.S.A.M. 1997] (discussing and advising on the principles of federal 
prosecution).  The Principles of Federal Prosecution were originally promulgated by Attorney 
General Benjamin Civiletti in 1980.  Id.  Because the entire Manual “contains general policies and 
some procedures relevant to the work of [federal prosecutors],” the Freedom on Information Act 
required it to be “ma[de] available for public inspection and copying.”  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 3-17.280 (2009) [hereinafter U.S.A.M. 2009]; 
see also Beck, supra note 170, at 314 n. 10. 
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have been left demonstrably unvindicated by a prior prosecution covering the 
same conduct (either state or federal) and a second prosecution is not barred by 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.172 
b.  Modernized Immunity Procedures 
Although the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction was transformative, 
substantial procedural reform was also necessary.  The RFK Justice Department 
addressed this need for reform by modernizing federal immunity procedures, an 
essential ingredient of proactive law enforcement and effective prosecution of 
complex crime.  Even though Congress had enacted dozens of federal immunity 
provisions—which covered certain types of offenses or applied in certain 
tribunals—since the mid-nineteenth century, in 1961, there was no general 
federal immunity statute.173  Virtually all of these piecemeal immunity 
provisions conferred transaction immunity, which was thought to be 
constitutionally required to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination.174   
This created a difficult and often unworkable situation, which RFK observed 
first-hand during the Racketts Committee investigations, where organized crime 
figures repeatedly “pleaded the fifth,” with no federal mechanism to compel 
                                                     
 172. The original press statement that evolved into the Petite Policy was issued in response to 
two 1959 Supreme Court decisions, see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United 
States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), which reiterated the dual sovereignty doctrine that two prosecutions 
by different sovereigns covering the same conduct were not prosecutions for the “same offense” 
and thus not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.  See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 150 (Black, J., 
dissenting).  Attorney General Rogers’ brief April 5, 1959 press release set forth no specific 
discretionary policy, general or otherwise.  See NORMAN ABRAMS AND SARA SUN BEALE, 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 756–57 (2d ed. 1993).  It simply noted that 
“those of us charged with law enforcement responsibilities have a particular duty to act wisely and 
with self-restraint in this area” and suggested that with “efficient and intelligent cooperation of state 
and federal law enforcement authorities, then consideration of a second prosecution very seldom 
should arise.”  Id. (reprinting the original 1959 statement in its entirety).  The present Petite Policy, 
which has been continually expanded and modified, sets forth the general guidance that a second 
prosecution is presumptively inappropriate unless a substantial federal interest has been 
demonstrably unvindicated.  U.S.A.M. 2009, at § 3-17.280.  The Policy then details several 
benchmarks to determine what constitutes a substantial federal interest and under what 
circumstances such interest could be determined to be demonstrably unvindicated.  Id. 
 173. The “need” for immunity in federal criminal prosecutions did not often arise until the 
advent and explosive growth of regulatory offenses as an adjunct to the evolving regulatory state 
and a more complex economic environment.  See Notes and Comments, The Federal Witness 
Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 
(1963) [hereinafter The Federal Witness Immunity Acts].  Whereas, in simpler times, accomplices 
to murder were unlikely to be candidates for immunity, parties possessing information necessary 
to vindicate governmental regulatory schemes but also facing criminal exposure presented a new 
and different challenge.  See id.  For a general discussion of the history of federal immunity written 
from a 1960s vantage point, see id. 
 174. See  H.R. REP. NO. 91-1188, 91st Cong. 13–38 (1970) (listing  the various federal 
transaction immunity statutes that existed in 1960, and which were ultimately replaced by a general 
use and derivative use immunity provision in the Crime Control Act of 1970). 
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their testimony.175  Other federal immunity statutes conferred use immunity, but 
did not cover derivative use of the compelled testimony.176  Those statutes were 
insufficient to supplant Fifth-Amendment protections, and thus were effectively 
toothless because they could not compel a witness to testify.177 
RFK recognized that the federal immunity issue had to be addressed in a 
comprehensive manner, and that the existing piecemeal approach was too 
haphazard and often ineffective.178  However, RFK was hamstrung by then-
existing legal doctrine that presupposed that only transaction immunity could 
constitutionally supplant the privilege against self-incrimination.179  Although 
RFK favored a general comprehensive immunity statute that would apply both 
to grand jury proceedings and at trial, his Justice Department did not propose a 
general federal transaction immunity statute because of significant,  
multi-prong opposition.180  Arguably, a broad immunity statute simply could 
result in an “immunity bath,” in which a clever criminal who was granted 
immunity for one offense would, while testifying, admit to other, more serious 
crimes that would be barred from prosecution.181  Civil liberties organizations 
strongly opposed the immunity legislation as well, contending that it was 
beneath the dignity of a democratic government to force citizens to provide 
“self-degrading” testimony.182 
RFK first proposed a slight modification to immunity legislation 
contemplated by the Eisenhower administration, which sought to expand 
                                                     
 175. See GOLDFARB, supra note 11, at 46; SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 188–89.  Shortly 
after Kennedy left the Justice Department, the government subpoenaed notorious crime boss Sam 
Giancana to testify before a federal grand jury.  Giancana pled the Fifth Amendment and declined 
to testify.  The government scrambled around and found a purportedly applicable statute which 
conferred immunity—the Federal Communications Act.  Giancana still refused to testify and was 
briefly incarcerated for contempt of court.  Upon his release, he moved to Mexico but still 
reportedly directed his criminal empire from abroad.  See GOLDFARB, supra note 11, at 307. 
 176. See Note, The Required Scope of Immunity Under the Fifth Amendment: Kastigar v. 
United States, 58 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1105–06 (1972). 
 177. For a discussion of these concepts, see id. at 1106 (1972).  See also William J. Bauer, 
Symposium: The Granting of Witness Immunity, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 143, 144–46 
(1976). 
 178. See The Federal Witness Immunity Acts, supra note 173, at 1568–77. 
 179. See id. at 1576. 
 180. Senate Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the Comm. on 
Govt. Operations, Organized Crime and Illicit Trade in Narcotics, 88th Cong. 18 (1st Sess. 1963) 
(testimony of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States). 
 181. For Senators Kefauver and Keating’s expression of concern over an “immunity bath,” see 
The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings Before 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 55–56 (1961).  For a general discussion of “immunity 
bath” concerns, see The Federal Witness Immunity Acts, supra note 173, at 1571–72; Adam H. 
Kurland, A Debtor’s Prism: Immunity for Bankrupts Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 55 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 177, 186 & n.65 (1981) (citing sources). 
 182. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 47 (1961) (statement of Lawrence Speiser, Director, 
Washington Office, American Civil Liberties Union). 
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transaction immunity to cover labor management racketeering offenses.183  The 
legislation did not pass.184  Not to be dissuaded, RFK proposed new immunity 
legislation the following year that covered a more specific list of crimes, 
including some public corruption offenses.185 
Congress did not enact either of RFK’s immunity proposals.186  The specter 
of unwittingly conferring “immunity baths” to a tawdry collection of hoodlums 
and racketeers must have seemed too high a price to pay.  However, the RFK 
Justice Department made the case that prosecutions under these new statutes 
often required testimony from “insiders,” and that conferring immunity might 
be the only avenue available to secure the necessary testimony. 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions rendered shortly after RFK’s tenure as 
attorney general largely eliminated the “immunity bath” concerns.  For example, 
in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, the Supreme Court strongly intimated that 
“use and derivative use immunity” was sufficient to supplant the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.187  The consequences of 
Murphy were substantial.  With a discretionary use and derivative use immunity 
statute, the government could compel testimony without having to grant the 
often unpalatable total transaction immunity; prosecutors could still charge 
witnesses testifying under use immunity if they established an independent 
source of evidence that in no way derived from the immunized testimony.188 
RFK’s unrelenting and frank elucidation of the issue during his tenure as 
attorney general, coupled with the shifting constitutional landscape reflected in 
Murphy, led to the 1970 enactment of a general comprehensive federal use and 
derivative use immunity statute.189  RFK greatly influenced the eventual 
adoption of this proactive prosecutorial tool essential for the successful 
investigation and prosecution of many white collar, organized crime, and 
                                                     
 183. See Martin R. Pollner, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s Legislative Program to 
Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 28 BROOK. L. REV. 37, 54–55 (1962). 
 184. See id. (noting that legislation passed in the Senate, but received no action in the House). 
 185. Senate Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the Comm. on 
Govt. Operations, Organized Crime and Illicit Trade in Narcotics, 88th Cong. 15, 18 (1st Sess. 
1963) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States) (noting that 
proposed  immunity legislation included a “bribery provision [that] could be used to advantage in 
our investigations of political corruption”). 
 186. See Pollner, supra note 183, at 56. 
 187. 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964). 
 188. See United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 942–45 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (outlining the 
application of use and derivative use immunity and the difficulty of establishing an independent 
source of evidence in which a witness testifies at a highly publicized congressional hearing under 
such a grant of immunity). 
 189. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–05 (2006) (providing present federal use and derivative use 
immunity statutes which are discretionary and apply, inter alia, at trial, grand jury proceedings, 
congressional hearings, and administrative agencies).  For a criticism of the statute as “far broader 
than any previously proposed,” see Bradley, supra note 76, at 686 & n.135. 
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potential corruption cases, and further helped to usher federal criminal law into 
the modern age.190 
2.  Congressional Reception of RFK’s Crime Package 
As noted above, most of the proposals in RFK’s organized crime package 
passed fairly quickly, except for the immunity and witness protection 
proposals.191  However, the relatively quick passage did not mean that the Justice 
Department’s proposals were enacted by a docile and compliant Congress.  
Contrary to the belief that the Travel Act breezed through Congress without 
significant scrutiny, the proposed legislation underwent considerable debate in 
both the House and the Senate. 
The Travel Act ultimately passed in substantially the same form as the original 
RFK Justice Department proposal.192  Accordingly, RFK and his Department 
deserve much of the credit for the innovativeness of the statute, particularly the 
use of state law predicates that greatly expanded the reach of federal jurisdiction.  
However, the statute, as enacted, was not identical to the original proposal.  
Congress did not pass the Travel Act until the Department of Justice accepted a 
broadening amendment that added use of the mails and use of an interstate 
facility—in addition to interstate travel—as “jurisdictional hooks,” and agreed 
to add clarifying temporal language requiring an act be committed subsequent 
to the interstate “travel.”193  Perhaps most importantly, the Justice Department 
successfully fought to remove an amendment that severely limited the bribery 
predicate.  The offending provision was removed from the final bill in 
conference committee.194 
                                                     
 190. See Bradley, supra note 76, at 687–88 (federal immunity provisions “greatly enhance” 
federal government’s ability to investigate organized crime and public corruption cases).  In 
Kastigar v. United States, the federal use and derivative use immunity statute was upheld as 
constitutionally extensive with the Fifth-Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  406 U.S. 
441, 462 (1972). 
 191. See Pollner, supra note 183. 
 192. See Bradley, supra note 76, at 71; see also Breen, supra note 4, at 126 n.13. 
 193. See United States v. Riccardelli, 794 F.2d 829, 831–32 (2d Cir. 1986) (looking to the 
legislative history of the Travel Act to determine what Congress meant by “mail” and “interstate 
facility”). 
 194. A common explanation for the lack of unified Southern states’ rights opposition and the 
prompt passage of a law that greatly increased the federal police power suggests that powerful 
Senate Judiciary Chairman James Eastland of Mississippi agreed to “ram” the legislation through 
in return for President Kennedy nominating Eastland’s bigoted roommate, Harold Cox, to a federal 
district court judgeship in Mississippi, within the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit.  HERSH, supra note 11, at 216; NAVASKY, supra note 11, at 48 (noting a popular, 
widespread rumor that Eastland’s assistance in insuring quick passage of anti-crime package was 
“the price” for appointing Cox).  Cox, an otherwise undistinguished and ignoble jurist, appeared to 
be an unusually strong bargaining chip.  Other rumors persisted that Eastland threatened to block 
Thurgood Marshall’s nomination to the Second Circuit unless President Kennedy nominated Cox.  
See SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 308.  Judge Cox gained an infamy of sorts for his obstructionist 
behavior in failing to enforce a series of Fifth Circuit desegregation decrees arising out of the 
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Specifically, the original Justice Department proposal did not include the 
“thereafter” performance provision, which required that some “in furtherance” 
act actually take place after a state line had in some manner been crossed.195  The 
House Judiciary Committee added this provision as a technical friendly 
amendment to the Senate bill after the Senate Judiciary Committee directed the 
Justice Department to add similar language out of concern that the proposed 
statute, as originally drafted, criminalized mere intent without any actual actus 
reus other than the mere crossing of a state line.196   The Justice Department 
welcomed these changes.197 
In addition, the original RFK proposal included all state and federal law 
extortion and bribery offenses.198  This was perhaps the most important and far-
reaching provision because it opened the door for the federal government to 
prosecute state and local corruption by incorporating state law bribery offenses, 
at least in situations in which the federal jurisdictional element could be 
satisfied.199 
The House passed a version of the statute that would have severely limited its 
reach, covering only bribery related to gambling, liquor, narcotics or prostitution 
offenses.200  However, future Supreme Court Justice Byron White emphatically 
argued on behalf of the Justice Department that the original, broader language 
was essential to combat organized crime and local corruption.201  As a result, 
Congress removed the limiting language and reinstated RFK’s original 
unrestricted language in the reconciliation bill that actually passed.202  The 
                                                     
Freedom Rider litigation and other civil rights matters.  See BARROW & WALKER, supra note 106, 
at 39. 
 195. See S. 1653, 87th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 1961). 
 196. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-966 (1st Sess. 1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2664, 2667. 
 197. See The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: 
Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 262 (1961) (statement of Assistant 
Attorney General Herbert Miller). 
 198. See S. 1653, 87th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 1961). 
 199. Again, the statute had a superficial similarity with the earlier federal criminal statutes 
based on the Commerce Clause requiring the crossing of a state line, but this statute also utilized 
the mails and use of an interstate facility.  Even the physical crossing of the state line element was 
more versatile because of the temporal disconnect between the crossing of the state line—by 
someone and the satisfaction of a “thereafter” performance element.  Also, application of basic 
aiding and abetting principles further expanded the liability net.  See Adam H. Kurland, To “Aid, 
Abet, Counsel, Command, Induce or Procure the Commission of an Offense”: A Critique of Federal 
Aiding and Abetting Principles, 57 S.C. L. REV. 85 (2005). 
 200. 107 CONG. REC. 16, 540–43 (1961); H.R. REP. NO. 87-966.  This was accomplished by 
amending subsection (b) of the proposed bill to read: “[a]s used in this section ‘unlawful activity’ 
means any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor, narcotics, or prostitution offenses, or 
extortion or bribery in connection with such offenses . . . (amended language italicized).”  Pollner, 
supra note 183, at 41 & n.27. 
 201. See Letter from Byron R. White, Deputy Attorney General, to Emmanuel Celler, 
Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (August 7, 1961), reprinted in relevant part in Pollner, 
supra note 183, at 41; see also Breen supra note 4, at 138 n.95 (citing the same letter). 
 202. See Pollner, supra note 183, at 42. 
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reinstatement of the original language was critical in maintaining the Travel Act 
as an effective federal prosecutorial tool to combat state and local corruption, 
regardless of whether an organized crime nexus existed in a particular case. 
Thus, the RFK Justice Department unabashedly recognized the connection 
between organized crime and local political corruption.  At best, federal criminal 
law enforcement in the past had nibbled around the edges of local political 
corruption.  In contrast, the RFK Justice Department focused on local corruption 
like never before, and consequently paved the way for the modern emphasis on 
the federal prosecution of state and local corruption, as well other complex 
“white collar crime” offenses.203  The genius of the Travel Act was that, by 
incorporating state law definitions of bribery and extortion into the requisite 
statutory elements, federal law could more easily reach local public corruption, 
even if the corruption lacked a demonstrable connection to racketeering or 
organized crime. 
RFK and other members of his Justice Department may have been fueled by 
idealism, but they were not naïve.  They understood that, in a democratic society, 
lasting change could not come from the end of a federal bayonet, but had to come 
from genuine support of the local community.  Speaking at the University of 
Georgia during his tenure as attorney general, RFK observed that “the hardest 
problems of all in law enforcement are those involving conflict of law and local 
custom.”204  Kennedy understood the almost therapeutic role a criminal jury trial 
                                                     
 203. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 40–41 (noting RFK Justice Department’s focus on 
“white-collar crime because this was the evolving trend and it was becoming as pervasive as it was 
difficult to prove,” as well as “political corruption because it was the final impact of organized 
crime on society,” and further noting RFK’s personal observation that a “racketeer is at his most 
dangerous not with a machine gun in his hands but with public officials in his pocket”).  In RFK’s 
later congressional testimony, he presciently noted the disturbing trend of the increase in insurance 
fraud, stock fraud, and bankruptcy fraud.  Senate Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. On 
Investigations of the Comm. on Govt. Operations, Organized Crime and Illicit Trade in Narcotics, 
88th Cong., 12–13 (1963) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States).  
In the following decades, these would subsequently evolve into significant federal prosecutorial 
priorities. 
 204. SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 294; GOLDFARB, supra note 11, at 34–37 (recognizing 
corrosive efforts of public corruption).  The problem of “local custom” and the local citizenry’s 
reluctance to voice objection, remain disturbingly evident today.  For example, in January, 2013 
federal prosecutors in Philadelphia brought a seventy-seven count indictment against nine local 
traffic court judges, charging fraud and perjury in a traffic ticket fixing scheme for the politically 
and socially connected.  Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia Traffic Court Judges Indicted for Fraud (Jan. 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2013/philadelphia-traffic-court-judges-indicted 
-for-fraud.  U.S. Attorney Zane Memeger noted that “[t]he scheme kept unsafe drivers on the road 
and deprived the city and state or revenues.”  MaryClaire Dale & Michael Rubinkam, 9 Judges 
Charged with Philadelphia Ticket Fixing, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 31, 2013) 
http://news.findlaw.com/apnews-lp.  Some of the defense lawyers countered that “their clients 
never took a dime, and simply did things the way they’ve been done for decades-and the way they 
were trained to do.”  Id.  Another lawyer added “ I don’t think that’s fraud . . . [i]t’s just kind of the 
way it works.”  Id. 
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could play.  Criminal prosecutions, albeit brought by presidentially appointed 
federal prosecutors, which resulted in verdicts rendered by local—although 
federally empanelled—juries, played a critical role the local citizenry’s 
understanding and eventual acceptance of the increased role of modern federal 
law enforcement.205 
D.  RFK Takes Additional Measures to Modernize Federal Criminal Law 
In addition to new legislative initiatives, the RFK Justice Department was 
creatively proactive in other ways, such as aggressive and innovative 
prosecution under existing statutes.206 A decade before the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act(RICO) was enacted, aggressive and imaginative 
Department of Justice lawyers like John C. Keeney—who would go on to 
become the longest serving federal prosecutor in history—helped the RFK 
Justice Department draft indictments that would “go after an entire enterprise 
and not simply after individuals for discrete crimes.”207  This was the beginning 
of another sea change in federal criminal law enforcement.208 
To complement the aggressive attitude at Main Justice, President Kennedy 
appointed U.S. attorneys who innovatively reshaped federal criminal law 
enforcement in the field.  For example, Robert Morgenthau—long before he 
served as the model for Adam Schiff, the venerable but cantankerous New York 
District Attorney in the long running NBC television drama  
Law & Order—was an aggressive and resourceful U.S. attorney for the high-
profile Southern District of New York.209 
Morgenthau is credited in some quarters for practically inventing modern 
white collar prosecutions by greatly expanding the manner in which his office 
prosecuted accountants and business executives for fraud.210  This was a new 
                                                     
 205. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 35–36 (noting some public attitudes to ignore political 
corruption and the requisite need to “change the public perception through education as much as 
prosecution”). 
 206. See id. at 40 (stating that the Department of Justice staff was “exhorted to use every law 
[it] could find to pursue the most powerful, pervasive, and elusive mobsters”). 
 207. See Emily Langer, Prosecutor’s Service Spanned 59 Years, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2011, 
at B8 (Obituary of John C. Keaney). 
 208. The RFK Justice Department’s focus on the moneyed kingpins of organized crime and 
other defendants, both corporate and individual, with financial means also spurred another 
development—the creation of the large firm white collar litigation practice.  See KENNETH MANN, 
DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1985).  This aspect of large firm practice was virtually non-
existent as late as 1980.  Id.  Now almost every large law firm has a high profile white collar 
litigation practice, although it is sometimes euphemistically referred to as a “corporate compliance” 
or “government investigations” practice group.  See generally GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 40–41 
(detailing the DOJ’s focus on different types of crime and defendants, who were clever, well 
organized, massively rich and powerful).  See also infra note 221 (concerning the transformation 
of the practice of federal criminal law under RFK). 
 209. See Terry Carter, District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, ABA J., June, 2010, at 34,  
35–37. 
 210. Id. at 37. 
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species of federal white collar prosecutions that aggressively utilized creative 
theories of accessorial liability and general federal fraud statutes without relying 
primarily on Title 21 criminal tax violations.211  These cutting-edge 
prosecutorial theories were novel in 1961, have since become commonplace and 
have been uniformly accepted.212  Similarly, Notre Dame Law Professor Robert 
Blakey, an RFK Justice Department alumnus, recognized the larger lessons of 
the RFK Justice Department.  Responding in 1994 to a question about RFK’s 
“crusade” against organized crime, crooked labor unions, and political 
corruption, Blakey noted that “Kennedy’s program . . . made all this [new focus 
and success] possible; without it none of these things would have happened.”213
  
After RFK left office, the federal criminal law snowball that his Justice 
Department created became an avalanche.  In 1962, RFK proposed 
comprehensive wiretap legislation that became law later in the decade.214  The 
“class of activities” approach to federal criminal jurisdiction, as reflected by 
congressional findings and the Perez doctrine,215 became an established method 
by which to draft federal criminal legislation based on the Commerce Clause.216  
The palatability of this jurisdictional expansion was undoubtedly a result of the 
trailblazing efforts of the Travel Act.217   Additionally, Congress enacted RICO 
along with several other key provisions in the Crime Control Act of 1970, 
including comprehensive wiretap legislation and a general federal immunity 
statute applicable to the entirety of federal criminal law.218  Since 1970, the 
increase in the number of new federal offenses has been described as 
“explosive.”219  In 2006, a Federalist Society study calculated that, in the 
approximate twenty-five year period since 1980, the total number of federal 
                                                     
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 212. See Carter, supra note 209, at 37–38. 
 213. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 311 (quoting a conversation with Professor Blakey). 
 214. See Bradley, supra note 76, at 682–83; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at  
392–94. 
 215. For a provocative discussion of the Perez doctrine, see Robert L. Stern, The Commerce 
Clause Revisited: The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271 (1973). 
 216. See Bradley supra note 76, at 684–86 (discussing the enactment of the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act, which, based on congressional findings, criminalized conduct without requiring 
proof that the particular conduct involved interstate commerce, and describing this development as 
a “new jurisdictional beachhead for the federal government”). 
 217. During the Senate Hearings on the proposed Travel Act, Senator Carroll of Colorado 
presciently commented that “I think we ought to understand what we are doing—once we open the 
door in here [to the federal jurisdictional expansion] there is no reason why we cannot legislate in 
any area affecting interstate commerce.”  The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized 
Crime and Racketeering: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 261 (1961). 
 218. See Bradley supra note 76, at 587–88. 
 219. See generally JOHN S. BAKER, MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LEGISLATION 3 (2006). 
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crimes increased by over one third, yielding over four thousand federal 
offenses.220    
While RFK’s Justice Department was not the sole catalyst for this 
transformation, his attorney generalship set the course that facilitated the 
impetus for the changes that would quickly come.  As such, by the beginning of 
the next decade, the modernization and transformation of federal criminal law, 
procedure, and administration was apparent.  The federal criminal law and 
federal criminal justice administration we recognize today was born in the RFK 
Justice Department a half-century ago.221 
Sadly, RFK’s contribution to modern federal criminal law did not end when 
he resigned as attorney general.  Rather, his contribution included a tragic and 
personal dimension.  His assassination, along with the 1963 assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy, also fundamentally reshaped federal criminal law 
jurisdiction.  The assassinations also influenced the enactment of federal gun 
control legislation in 1968222 and were more directly responsible for the 
subsequent expansion of various federal homicide statutes.223 
In 1968, RFK, then a United States Senator from New York, sought the 
Democratic presidential nomination.224  In June of 1968, he was assassinated in 
Los Angeles after winning the California primary election.225  At the time, the 
                                                     
 220. Id. 
 221. The RFK Justice Department, and RFK himself, also played a pivotal role in transforming 
the practice of federal criminal law.  See John Cleary, Federal Defender Services: Serving the 
System or the Client?, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 67 & n.14 (1995).  RFK had significant input 
in the creation of the modern compensation system and the creation of Federal Public Defender 
services to provide competent counsel for indigent federal criminal defendants, and also played a 
role in the development of a modern and more humane federal penal system.  Id. (noting that 
Attorney General RFK ordered the first comprehensive review of federal defender services, known 
as the “Allen Report,” in 1963); see also NAVASKY, supra note 11, at 440–41 (noting RFK’s pivotal 
role in the development of programs designed for the poor to obtain justice in the federal courts); 
SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 392–94 (discussing Allen Report, the creation of federal defender 
services, and also noting RFK’s role in closing the “dungeons of Alcatraz”). 
In addition, RFK’s focus on political corruption and “white collar” crime also ultimately created 
the financial opportunities that fundamentally transformed the private criminal defense bar.  MANN, 
supra note 208.  Eventually, large prestigious law firms, who had virtually nothing to do with 
criminal law practice as late as 1980, would come to embrace “white collar” and “government 
compliance” practice groups.  See, e.g., id.; Charles Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth 
Amendment: The Rise of Corporate White-Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1221, 1223–24 (2011) (noting that the emphasis on new federal crimes and new federal 
prosecution policies created enormous business opportunities for large law firms, and stigma 
against criminal practice largely evaporated). 
 222. See Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 133, 146–47 (1975).  The assassination of Martin Luther King in April 1968, two 
months before RFK’s assassination, also played a role.  Id. at 146–48. 
 223. See, e.g., Act of August 28, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-141, 79 Stat. 580, 580–81 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1751 (2006)). 
 224. People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Cal. 1972). 
 225. Id. 
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murder of a presidential candidate or a member of Congress was not a federal 
offense.226  As a result of the Kennedy assassinations, Congress passed 
legislation making the murder of the president, a member of Congress, and, 
eventually, a major candidate for president, a federal crime.227  Previous 
presidential assassinations and assassination attempts did not result in new 
federal criminal legislation, and the homicides were prosecuted as local 
crimes.228 
                                                     
 226. Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 351, 84 Stat. 1880, 1891 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. 351 (2006)). 
 227. See id.; see also 79 Stat. at 580. 
 228. After President Kennedy was assassinated, suspect Lee Harvey Oswald was taken into 
local custody, where he was killed by Jack Ruby.  See Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793, 794 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1966).  At the time, no federal presidential murder statute had been enacted, so 
the murder of the President was simply a state law homicide.  VINCENT BUGLIOSI, FOUR DAYS IN 
NOVEMBER: THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY 356 (2007).  The state of the 
law had not changed from the time of the last presidential assassination in New York in 1901, when 
President McKinley’s assassin was tried in New York state court and was convicted and executed 
within fifty days of McKinley’s death.  See SCOTT MILLER, THE PRESIDENT AND THE ASSASSIN: 
MCKINLEY, TERROR, AND THE EMPIRE AT THE DAWN OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY (2011); 
LeRoy Parker, The Trial of Anarchist Murderer Czolgosz, 18 YALE L.J. 80 (1901).  Secret Service 
protection of the President was added after McKinley’s assassination.  See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1828, 
at 256 (2d Sess. 1979).  However, the murder of the President remained outside the reach of federal 
criminal jurisdiction. 
Despite the absence of a presidential murder statute in the Federal Criminal Code, the other two 
presidential assassinations were not tried in “state” courts because of sui generis and jurisdictional 
anomalies.  See EDWARD STEERS, JR., THE LINCOLN ASSASSINATION ENCYCLOPEDIA 373 (2010); 
Executive Order Creating Military Commission and Special Order 211, May 1 and 6, 1865 
(appointing a Military Commission to meet in Washington D.C. to adjudicate conspiracy to 
assassinate President Lincoln and other officers of the United States, as such acts were viewed as 
acts of war), reprinted in EDWARD J. STEERS, JR., THE TRIAL: THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT 
LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS 17 (2013).  President Garfield’s assassin, who 
committed his crime in the District of Columbia in 1881, was tried in the local courts of the District 
of Columbia.  For an excellent account of the Garfield assassination, the resulting trial and the 
medical incompetence evident in Garfield’s medical care, see Candice Millard, DESTINY OF THE 
REPUBLIC: A TALE OF MADNESS, MEDICINE AND THE MURDER OF A PRESIDENT (2011).  Since 
Garfield lingered for several months before ultimately succumbing to his wounds after he had been 
transferred to New Jersey to convalesce, Garfield’s assassin pursued several post trial remedies 
asserting the District of Columbia lacked jurisdiction because Garfield had died elsewhere.  These 
legal challenges were ultimately unsuccessful. 
During the 1972 presidential campaign, Alabama Governor George Wallace was shot while seeking 
the Democratic presidential nomination in advance of the Maryland primary.  WILLARD M. OLIVER 
& NANCY MARION, KILLING THE PRESIDENT: ASSASSINATIONS, ATTEMPTS AND RUMORED 
ATTEMPTS ON U.S. COMMANDERS IN CHIEF 166 (2010).  His assailant, Arthur Bremmer, was tried 
in Maryland state court because Wallace was not a federal officeholder.  Id.; see also C. Benjamin 
Ford & Margie Hyslop, The Wallace Shooting—40 Years Later, GAZETTE.NET (May 11, 2012), 
http://www.gazette.net/article/20120511/NEWS 
/705119655/1122/The-Wallace-shooting-40-years-later&template+gazette.  As such, the 1971 
enactment noted above did not confer federal jurisdiction over this offense.  In 1986, section 351(a) 
was amended to include the murder or attempted murder of “a major” presidential candidate.  
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On a less grim but no less important note, President Kennedy’s appointment 
of his brother as attorney general prompted the passage of anti-nepotism 
legislation in 1967, which barred close relatives of the president from serving in 
the cabinet.229  Never again would a sibling serve as attorney general in his 
sibling’s presidential administration.230 
Unlike many of the other federal criminal law developments of the last 
quarter-century, which are often seen as one-sided, pro-prosecution calibrations, 
RFK’s Justice Department devoted energy to the entire holistic criminal justice 
enterprise and addressed indigent defense funding and incarceration concerns.231   
Any attorney who has ever received a dime for representing a federal defendant 
under the Criminal Justice Act owes a debt of gratitude to RFK.  Had RFK not 
served as attorney general, the criminal justice system would have changed 
eventually.  However, the pace and scope of change, as well as the consequences 
for the development of federal criminal law in the last fifty years, likely would 
have been much different. 
Attorney General RFK put into place the critical building blocks of modern 
federal criminal law.  In viewing the big picture—the modern complex and 
interdependent nationwide economy, more sophisticated crime, the growth of 
white collar fraud and political corruption crimes that could not be prosecuted 
successfully at the local level—RFK’s contribution was necessary and essential 
to the creation of effective modern federal criminal law enforcement. 
III.  THE PRESENT-DAY CHALLENGES TO THE RFK JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 
LEGACY OF MODERN FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AS IT REACHES 
MIDDLE AGE 
Today, federal criminal law is very broad, includes conduct also criminalized 
under state law, and necessarily operates with substantial prosecutorial 
discretion guided by comprehensive, publicly available prosecutorial 
guidelines.232  Despite a growing chorus of originalist rhetoric, modern federal 
                                                     
Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-646, sec. 62(1), 100 
Stat. 3592, 3614 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2006)). 
 229. 5 U.S.C. § 3110 (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 230. Id. (preventing a president from appointing his siblings to the cabinet). 
 231. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 392–94 (noting RFK’s involvement in federal 
indigent defense funding proposals and in the closing of dungeon-like Alcatraz prison). 
 232. Department of Justice guidelines unequivocally state that they are for internal purposes 
only and confer no legally enforceable right on criminal defendants.  See ABRAMS, BEALE & 
KLEIN, supra note 33, at 105, 112; see also United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754–55 (1979); 
Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 173 (1954).  Although judicial review is unavailable, that 
does not mean all decisions are immune from all review.  It is not uncommon for various federal 
prosecutorial policies and decisions to face congressional inquiry and intense media scrutiny.  See, 
e.g., Danielle Douglas, Senators Question Justice on Wall St. Penalties, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 
2013, at A14 (describing Senators’ complaints that penalties were disproportionately low and that 
there was a lack of charges against individuals fostered concerns that Wall Street enjoys favored 
status); Matt Taibbi, Too Big to Jail, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 28, 2013, at 51.  In addition, some 
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criminal law has evolved to a point at which it governs a substantial amount 
complex criminal activity that, in many cases, cannot be prosecuted effectively 
by state law enforcement.  The current state of affairs echoes many of the 
concerns RFK faced in 1961, although the shortcomings of contemporary state 
law enforcement may be articulated somewhat differently.233 
Today, modern federal criminal law enforcement operates, to a degree, with 
some clouds on the horizon. 234  Violent crime has decreased for the fifth straight 
                                                     
members of Congress recently questioned the charging decisions in the high profile internet piracy 
case of Aaron Swartz, a brash twenty-six-year-old internet entrepreneur and outspoken opponent 
of two internet-related censorship bills.  He was charged with various cyber crimes, faced 
considerable prison time even if he pled guilty, and ultimately committed suicide while the charges 
were pending.  The bipartisan letter to Attorney General Holder inquired, inter alia, whether 
Swartz’s high profile opposition to the above noted bills was a factor in the prosecution’s decision 
making process regarding plea offers and sentencing proposals. Congress Weighs in on DOJ’s 
Handling of Swartz Prosecution, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/01; see also David Amsden, The Brilliant Life and Tragic 
Death of Aaron Swartz, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 28, 2013, at 58; Stephanie Francis Ward, Hacker’s 
Hell: After Broad Prosecutions-and One Suicide-Many Want to Narrow Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, ABA J., May, 15, 2013, at 15. 
 233. For example, a common rationale for “overfederalization” is the perceived overall failure 
of state criminal justice systems.  See THIRD ATTORNEY GENERALS’ FORUM (C-Span 1993), 
available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/videolibrary/mobilevideo.php?progie=42097 (noting the 
pressure to federalize based on perceived failure of state criminal justice system); see also United 
States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 694 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting “beneficial role” of federal public 
corruption prosecutions of state and local officials where state prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute 
political allies or superiors); Kurland, First Principles, supra note 20, at  
1–3 (noting similar concerns); Kurland, Guarantee Clause, supra note 85, at 376–81 (noting 
systemic shortcomings in many state systems resulting the ineffective prosecution of local 
corruption and also noting many procedural advantages of federal prosecution). 
For a slightly different conceptualization of the issue, see Norman Abrams, The Distance 
Imperative: A Different Way of Thinking About Public Official Corruption 
Investigations/Prosecutions and the Federal Role, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 207 (2011).  In addition, 
one state, Maryland, has created a permanent “Office of the Maryland State Prosecutor,” which 
“takes on cases that are too politically sensitive for Maryland’s elected state’s attorneys or attorney 
general—and too small for federal prosecutors.”  Ann E. Marimow, In Fighting Corruption, 
Tenacity With Conviction, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2013, at C1, 5.  However, the office is not viewed 
as a complete alternative or substitute for federal prosecution.  Id.  The office defers to the Maryland 
U.S. attorney’s office on complex corruption cases.  Id. 
 234. The past fifty years have also seen an increase in the politicization of attorney general 
nominations and a greater number of personal attacks on the attorney general, perhaps a sobering 
byproduct of the new federal criminal law frontier.  See. e.g., Sara Horwitz, A Gun-Running Sting 
Gone Fatally Wrong, WASH. POST, Jul. 15, 2011, at A6–7 (reporting partisan attacks directed at 
Attorney General Holder); Pete Williams, Investigation Finds No Evidence That AG Eric Holder 
Knew of ‘Fast and Furious’ Gun-Running Sting, NBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2012, 2:01 PM), 
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/19/13966068-investigation-finds-no-evidence 
-ag-eric-holder-knew-of-fast-and-furious-gun-running-sting?lite. 
RFK was confirmed with only one dissenting vote.  107 CONG. REC. 1030-33 (1st Sess. 1961).  
Today, that consensus confirmation seems a relic of a bygone era.  Although some subsequent 
attorney general confirmation votes have been unanimous or near unanimous, there has been a 
marked increase in confirmation votes since 1976 in which the nominee received at least twenty 
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year.235  However, white collar offenses, economic crimes, and public corruption 
have not decreased, and remain problems that require a substantial federal law 
enforcement response.236  It is imperative that these problems are dealt with in a 
responsible manner, and that politics and ideological rhetoric do not ultimately 
erode the vital advancements in federal criminal law enforcement and federal 
criminal jurisdiction that have developed in the  
half-century since RFK’s attorney generalship.  Broad federal criminal law is 
necessary to ensure effective law enforcement of complex crime with national 
dimensions.237  Likewise, federal corruption prosecutions of state and local 
officials are essential to ensure the integrity of our democratic institutions.238 
More than fifteen years ago, Roger Pilon of the CATO Institute fired a 
rhetorical early warning shot, espousing classic Anti-Federalist thought, 
condemning much of modern federal criminal jurisdiction as unconstitutional, 
and advocating for narrow federal criminal law jurisdiction.239  The rightward 
pull of the debate has questioned the wisdom and the legitimacy of the broad 
federal criminal law doctrines that underlie most of the important advancements 
in the last fifty years.240  The Tea Party movement, in which rhetorical attacks 
                                                     
votes against confirmation.  See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 2214 (1st Sess. 1977) (confirming Griffin 
Bell, 75 to 21); 131 CONG. REC. 3339 (1st Sess. 1985) (confirming Edwin Meese, 63 to 31); 147 
CONG. REC. 981 (1st Sess. 2001) (confirming John Ashcroft, 58 to 42); 151 CONG. REC. 923 (1st 
Sess. 2005) (confirming Alberto Gonzales, 60 to 36); 153 CONG. REC. 14-147 (1st Sess. 2007) 
(confirming Michael Mukasey, 53 to 40); 155 CONG. REC. 1266 (1st Sess. 2009) (confirming Eric 
Holder, 75 to 21). 
 235. Pete Yost, FBI: Violent Crime Down for Fifth Straight Year, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2012 
at, A17.  For a provocative discussion suggesting that the long-term decrease in crime has had a 
negative political impact on the Republican Party, see Charles Lane, The Victims of Safer Streets, 
WASH POST. Nov. 27, 2012, at A15 (arguing that conservative crime doctrine remains dominant in 
Republican Party politics, and a decrease in crime has been a political disaster for the Republican 
Party). 
 236. See MANN, supra note 208, at 19–20 (noting the advancements made in the area of white 
collar crime). 
 237. See, e.g., J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: Reflections on Michael, 
Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 468 n.18, 51–52 (2007) (asserting that 
the unsettled state of federal white collar crime over the last several decades has supplanted state 
law enforcement prerogatives and was further augmented by federal prosecutors’ novel and creative 
use of new prosecutorial theories “to expand the boundaries of white collar criminal law”). 
 238. See United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1962) (“[A] 
democracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to 
be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions 
of malfeasance and corruption.”). 
 239. Roger Pilon, A Matter for the States, WASH. POST, June 18, 1996, at A13. 
 240. Basic Tea Party philosophy is grounded in a rigid dual federalism and emphasizes that the 
federal government has limited powers and that, therefore, much of the expansive Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence of the last seventy years is illegitimate.  See, e.g., RAND PAUL, THE TEA 
PARTY GOES TO WASHINGTON 108–10, 117–28 (2011) (explaining basic Tea Party ideology).  
There is much academic and statistical literature noting the explosive growth of the number of 
federal crimes since 1970, much of which is based on broad interpretations of the Commerce 
Clause.  See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 219; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, 
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on an illegitimate leviathan federal government and criticism of broad federal 
power in general are in vogue, has succeeded in driving the Republican Party far 
to the right on many of these issues.241 
In this shifting political landscape, it is imperative that advocates of modern 
federal criminal law articulate sound legal and constitutional doctrinal bases to 
support a necessarily broad federal criminal law jurisdiction and contemporary 
criminal law enforcement.242  Whatever proponents ultimately determine to be 
the source—the commerce clause, the “Constitution is not a suicide pact” 
                                                     
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 6–7 (1998).  Even some less-fervently ideological 
entities, such as the Smart on Crime Coalition, have addressed the problem of over federalization 
as part of their proposed criminal justice agenda.  See, e.g., SMART ON CRIME COALITION, SMART 
ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 9–10 (2011) 
(recommending that Congress adopt rules and reporting requirements to stem  
over-criminalization and over-federalization). 
The pace of conservative attacks on the scope of the federal police power seems to have accelerated.  
For example, respected conservative commentator George Will, perhaps emboldened by the 
increased public acceptance of these extreme positions, recently reemphasized that “[t]oday, 
Congress exercises police powers never granted by the Constitution.”  George F. Will, The 
Constitutional Cost of Morality ‘Wars’ WASH. POST, June 16, 2013, at A19.  Earlier, Will 
approvingly quoted Senator Rand Paul, who had recently opined that “the proliferation of federal 
crimes undermine federalism.”  George F. Will, Sense on Sentencing, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, 
at A15.  Senator Paul continues to move into the GOP mainstream as he appears to position himself 
for a presidential run, thus making his views on the federal police power more than a fringe 
curiosity.  See, e.g., Karen Tumulty, Rand Paul Moving From Fringes Into Mainstream, WASH. 
POST, June 20, 2013, at A1. 
 241. A few representative examples are illustrative.  The conservative/libertarian CATO 
Institute took out large newspaper ads—entitled “Constitutional Authority”—noting that the 112th 
Congress imposed a new rule that requires Congress to cite specific constitutional authority when 
introducing new legislation.  See, e.g., Advertisement, Constitutional Authority, WASH. POST, Feb. 
8, 2011, at A4.  However, these advertisements warned that merely “reflexively citing the three 
most widely misunderstood clauses—the General Welfare, Commerce, and Necessary and Proper 
Clauses—they’ll violate the document they’ve sworn to uphold.”  Id.  During the 2012 Republican 
Primary Debates, the Tea Party rightward pull was evident, as the candidates repeatedly 
emphasized the call to repeal substantial amounts of federal regulatory legislation, many of which 
contain important federal criminal provisions.  Amy Gardner, GOP Candidates Exchange Views 
on Constitution and How U.S. Has Strayed, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2011, at A5.  A Washington Post 
editorial questioned whether “the GOP establishment [was] ever really serious about [Tea Party 
Initiatives] staging a ‘second American revolution’ or slashing the federal government back to what 
it was in 1789?”  Eugene Robinson, A Storm the GOP Didn’t Expect, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2012, 
at A13. 
 242. For a thoughtful analysis concluding that the “‘overfederalization’ of criminal law is not 
a problem,” see Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of 
Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 79–80 (2012); see also Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, 
Overfederalization of Criminal Law? It’s a Myth, 28 CRIM. JUST. 23, 28–30 (2013).  It is 
noteworthy that the authors felt compelled to state that they “we[re] not apologists for federal 
prosecutors.”  Id. at 32.  For a critique on the supposed soundness of originalist doctrine, see Frank 
B. Cross, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 193–94 (2013). 
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formula,243 post-Civil War “tacit” postulates of federalism,244 the Guarantee 
Clause,245 Justice Stephen Breyer’s “pragmatic approach,”246 or some 
combination—the constitutional, legal, and policy justifications must be 
forcefully and persuasively articulated so that contemporary federal criminal law 
remains effective and relevant today and in the future.247  This is the principal 
                                                     
 243. The famous rhetorical phrase, “the Constitution is not a suicide pact,” expresses the 
principle that constitutional interpretation must be undertaken in a manner that properly considers 
urgent and practical needs.  See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (recognized as one of the first uses of the phrase); see also RICHARD POSNER, NOT A 
SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006).  But see Irfram 
Khawaja, Book Review, DEMOCRATIYA, 8, 95, 99, Spring 2007 (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, NOT 
A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY) (arguing that 
Posner’s thesis—that Constitution is an eloquent but fundamentally out-of-touch document that 
does not allow judges to adequately address modern concerns—cannot be convincingly limited 
terrorism and national emergencies).  As expressed in this book review, the main point of contention 
turns on the parameters of may be considered a dire national emergency.  Id. 
 244. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433 (1979) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing 
unstated constitutional principles inherent in the federalism structure of the Constitution). 
 245. See generally Kurland, Guarantee Clause, supra note 85 (noting that the Guarantee 
Clause is a source of federal authority to enact public corruption offenses criminalizing the conduct 
of state and local public officials). 
 246. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 71–73 (2010) 
(arguing that the public’s confidence in the Court cannot be taken for granted, so it is essential that 
the Court not adopt constitutional principles that prevent the federal government from addressing 
modern national concerns). 
 247. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(acknowledging that this was the first case in nearly sixty years in which the Court struck down a 
federal statute for exceeding the Commerce Clause).  Despite the potentially transformative holding 
in Lopez, the Court has been much more circumspect in its modern delineation of the scope of the 
Commerce Clause.  The Court clearly has not embarked on a suicide binge to kill modern federal 
criminal law.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (applying the Perez doctrine “class 
of activities” approach to uphold federal criminal narcotics statutes under the Commerce Clause 
without requiring a specific jurisdictional element in statute or proof of the individualized effect on 
commerce in each case); United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 671 (1995) (sidestepping 
constitutional issue holding that gold mine was sufficiently engaged in interstate commerce); see 
also Kurland, First Principles, supra note 20, at 5 & n.14 (discussing and citing authorities debating 
whether Lopez represented a “constitutional moment” or “constitutional minute”).  Nevertheless, 
the concerns expressed in this Article are not exaggerated or alarmist.  For example, in the recent 
Obamacare decision, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2591 (2012), after an unprecedented three days of oral argument, five Justices advocated a narrow 
view of federal authority under the Commerce Clause.  Id. (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).  This 
view could be problematic if applied to subsequent federal criminal jurisdictional challenges to 
statutes based on various broad permutations of the Commerce Clause, the taxing power, or the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  Compare Thai Phi Le, Affordable Care Act and the Scope of Federal 
Power, WASH. LAWYER, Jan. 2013, 20, 26 (“Whether or not the Court will use the [Obamacare 
decision] precedent’s far-reaching language evident in Justice Roberts’ opinion to seriously 
constrain congressional authority [in other subject-matter areas] in the future is a question that 
awaits resolution”), with Stern, supra note 217, at 285 & n.79 (noting that the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 approved a resolution declaring that national legislature ought to legislate, inter 
alia, in those cases “where the states are separately incompetent”).  For a thoughtful analysis of the 
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challenge facing modern federal criminal law enforcement and federal criminal 
jurisdiction at middle age. 
Lastly, even some core federalism disputes thought to have been resolved in 
the Second Reconstruction have been resurrected.  For example, problems with 
the 2000 presidential election248 and issues with recently enacted voting 
regulation laws249 have renewed tensions between the desirability of imposing 
uniform federal election standards and local laws that supposedly address 
particular local concerns.  Political cries to “nullify” federal laws, from health 
care to proposed gun control initiatives, have increased, particularly in the 
South.250 
With regard to federal criminal law enforcement, the current medical 
marijuana and state legalization initiatives conundrum also pits federal criminal 
law jurisdiction and the Supremacy Clause against states’ rights and state 
prerogatives.251  Likewise, the current gun control debate in the wake of the 
                                                     
fractured Roberts Court, see Marica Coyle, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
CONSTITUTION (2013). 
 248. The Bush-Gore 2000 presidential election controversy concerned the vote count in 
Florida, and served to highlight the reality that a presidential election is really fifty-one separate 
elections, governed by fifty-one separate byzantine election procedures, plus a myriad of local 
election procedures. See generally CORRESPONDENTS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES, 36 DAYS: THE 
COMPLETE CHRONICLE OF THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CRISIS (2001).  In addition, a related 
issue gaining more steam concerns various state legislatures’ consideration of preliminary 
proposals to modify their respective electoral vote selection procedures—as is their constitutional 
prerogative.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also Nia-Malika Henderson & Errin Haines, 
GOP is Pushing Electoral Changes, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2013, at A1 (highlighting that several 
states are currently wholly controlled by Republicans at the state level and voted for President 
Obama in the 2012 presidential election and that Virginia, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania are 
considering changing electoral vote allocation laws from the present “winner take all” system to a 
system that awards electoral votes by congressional district); Albert Hunt, Changing the Path to 
the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/us/28iht 
-letter28.html?_r=0. 
 249. See, e.g., Ethan Bonner, Voter ID Rules Fail Court Tests Across Country, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 3, 2012, at A1 (highlighting state-level contentiousness regarding voter ID laws). 
 250. See, e.g., Jeffrey Collins, S. Carolina Seeks to Nullify Numerous Federal Initiatives, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2013 at A14 (noting that “nullification” arguments “should have been settled 
after Abraham Lincoln’s vision of federal power won the Civil War”); Richard Simon, Moves Afoot 
in Some States to Dodge New Federal Gun Laws, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2013, at A17; see also 
Manny Fernandez, White House Rejects Petitions to Secede, but Texans Fight On, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
15, 2013 (noting various southern state petitions to secede filed in wake of 2012 reelection of 
President Obama).  These concerns over unpopular federal laws have also given rise to a proposed 
“Repeal [constitutional] Amendment,” which would authorize a repeal of federal legislation upon 
approval of such a resolution by two-thirds of the states.  See Randy E. Barnett, The Case for the 
Repeal Amendment, 78 TENN. L. REV. 813, 816 (2011). 
 251. The Obama Justice Department has been mostly silent on these state marijuana initiatives, 
despite criticism from several past former DEA administrators that such silence effectively 
constitutes “tacit acceptance of these dangerous initiatives.”  Sari Horwitz, Justice Department 
Silent on Marijuana Initiatives: Measures in 3 States Would Legalize Sale of Drug for Recreational 
Use, WASH. POST., Oct. 12, 2012, at A1; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States’ Rights Blues 
to Blue States’ Rights: Federalism After the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 811 
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Newtown and Navy Yard massacres had a certain rhetorical déjà vu quality.  In 
a speech delivered in Minneapolis, Minnesota to garner support for the 
restoration of the ban on military-style assault weapons, President Obama 
evoked the Depression-era image of the proud but beleaguered constable, 
emphasizing that “[o]ur law enforcement officers should never be out-gunned 
on the streets.”252   The common saying that “the more things change the more 
things remain the same”253 seems as equally apt as the subtle curse to consign 
one to “live in interesting times.”254  RFK would feel eerily right at home in 
confronting these challenges. 
The influence of Tea Party thought, constant Tenth Amendment refrains in 
modern political discourse—including the “Obamacare” decision, with five 
Justice’s endorsing a limited view of the Commerce Clause—and recent 
comments by some federal legislators reveal an increased focus on Anti-
Federalist themes and a narrow, literal construction view of constitutional 
interpretation as a modern limiting force on the role of the federal 
government.255  This goes far beyond academic debate of originalism, at least as 
                                                     
(2006) (noting contemporary circumstances in which state and local programs such as medical 
marijuana initiatives conflict with federal law, and further noting instances where conservative 
federal law makers seek to impose nationwide social restrictions that would trump state law); Tim 
Dickinson, Are Voters Going to Pot?, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 16, 2112 at 44, (discussing ballot 
measures that “could strike a dramatic blow against the federal War on Drugs”).  Washington and 
Colorado voters passed initiatives legalizing the possession of small amounts of marijuana.  See 
generally Brady Dennis, Colorado Starts to Plot Course for Legal Pot, WASH. POST Dec. 15, 2012, 
at A3; Charlie Savage, Administration Weighs Legal Action Against States That Legalized 
Marijuana Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec 7, 2012, at A20.  For a provocative analysis of the current conflict 
between federal and various state marijuana laws, see ROBERT A. MIKOS, CATO INST., ON THE 
LIMITS OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY WHEN STATES RELAX (OR ABANDON) MARIJUANA BANS (2012) 
(Policy Analysis No. 714).  At the time this Article was completed, the Obama Justice Department 
finally issued a memorandum directed to all U.S. attorneys providing that the Department would 
defer its right to challenge the various state legalization laws at this time and, in effect, would not 
expend prosecutorial resources to prosecute conduct legal under state law, absent the existence of 
an important federal interest in a particular case.  Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy 
Attorney General, to United States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013). 
 252. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks By the President 
on Preventing Gun Violence in Minneapolis, MN (Feb. 4, 2013, 1:46 PM), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/04/remarks-president-preventing-gun 
-violence-minneapolis-mn. 
 253. Translated from the original quote by Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr in Les Guépes (Jan. 
1849). 
 254. See supra note 3. 
 255. For example, Republican Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma justified placing a Senate 
hold on bill to fund the District of Columbia Metro system on the ground that the Constitution does 
not mention local urban transit systems.  Tom Coburn, Why I Put a Hold on Metro Oversight Bill, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2010, http://voices,washingtonpost.com/local-opinions 
/2010/08/why_i.put-a-hold-on-the-metro.html.  Former Republican Congressman Roscoe Bartlett 
(R. Md.) stated his opposition to federal student loan programs, contending that he had carefully 
read the constitution and could find no evidence “that the federal government should be involved 
in education.”  Ben Pershing, Bartlett Says He Regrets Remark, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2012, at B8.  
The comment received significant attention because of his follow-up comment that “once you start 
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far as federal law enforcement is concerned.  This broadside constitutes a 
potential threat to the continuity of modern federal criminal law jurisdiction.  
This challenge cannot simply be ignored as extremist and trivial.  Rather, it 
requires a thoughtful and comprehensive response that includes a focus, not 
merely on the issues in 1789, but also on recognition of the positive 
advancements in federal criminal law enforcement in the last fifty years and 
recognition of the practical limitations of state and local law enforcement.  To 
remain effective, federal criminal must be interpreted and applied in a sound 
manner that provides national solutions to national problems, which the federal 
government can most effectively address.256 
Remarkably, the Travel Act, which exists today in near identical form as its 
original enactment, remains important a half-century after its enactment.  
Indeed, the statute remains a useful tool in contemporary bribery and public 
corruption prosecutions.257  It also retains its creative flexibility.  For example, 
the Travel Act served as the foundation of the federal prosecution of Michael 
Vick on dog fighting and gambling related charges.258  Furthermore, prosecutors 
often include Travel Act counts as important charges in Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act prosecutions.259  Finally, modern federal criminal law enforcement 
would be substantially undermined without the immunity procedures that are in 
place today based, in significant part, on the RFK Justice Department’s efforts. 
                                                     
down the slippery slope of relatively benign unconstitutional actions you may end up with the 
Holocaust.”  Id.  For a general discussion, see Randy E. Barnett, Symposium, Interpretation and 
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011). 
 256. See Jeff Shesol, Bashing the Supremes: Why Obama should leave the court alone this fall, 
NEWSWEEK, June 25, 2012, at 13–14 (opining that in a second Obama Administration, the President 
“simply cannot keep mum as the five conservative justices [with a cramped constitutional vision] 
prevent the national government from solving national problems”). 
 257. See, e.g., Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, Alternatives to Honest Services Fraud, 
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 2010 (highlighting Supreme Court decisions limiting mail fraud statutes to 
prosecute official corruption, “[u]ndoubtedly, the government will revisit other statutes, long in 
existence [including the Travel Act] to prosecute corruption”); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s, 
Eastern District of Arkansas, Four Crittendon County Men Charged With Conspiracy to Commit 
Election Fraud (Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/are/news 
/2012/September/Hallumetal_electionfraud_Infoplea_090512.html (citing “the first known use of 
Travel Act to prosecute vote buying scheme concerning a purely local election”). 
 258. See Adam H. Kurland, The Prosecution of Michael Vick: Of Dogfighting, Depravity, Dual 
Sovereignty, and “A Clockwork Orange,” 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 465, 476–78 (2011) 
(analyzing Vick’s Travel Act conspiracy indictment arising out of dog fighting and illegal gambling 
allegations, and questioning whether federal prosecution was an appropriate exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion ). 
 259. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION & U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMSSION, ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012) available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal 
/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf (noting that the Travel Act and other statutes may also apply to federal 
prosecutions of US companies doing business overseas); Thomas Fox, Robert Kennedy, the Travel 
Act and the FCPA, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Feb. 22, 2010), 
http://corporatecomplianceinsights.com/robert-kennedy-travel-act-fcpa (summarizing the Travel 
Act and Discussing Its Contemporary Relevance). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Robert F. Kennedy’s tenure as attorney general was transcendent.  Under his 
guidance, the Department of Justice expanded federal criminal law both 
substantively and procedurally to effectively create modern federal criminal law.  
These efforts were both necessary and appropriate. 
RFK became attorney general less than a generation after it became apparent 
that state and local law enforcement could not keep up with complex modern 
crime, much of which included an interstate dimension.   RFK understood this 
reality and forcefully and creatively shaped the federal police power in novel 
and expansive ways.  By virtue of his position on the Rackets Committee, RFK 
brought a unique personal perspective, having observed firsthand the impotence 
of federal power that, in the middle of the twentieth century, was still largely 
shackled by quaint notions of eighteenth and nineteenth century federalism. 
The Travel Act, acknowledged by RFK as his most controversial legislative 
proposal, was the signature achievement of his attorney generalship.  Perhaps 
underappreciated at the time, the Travel Act’s breadth permitted federal criminal 
law to reach a wide variety of criminal conduct previously not reachable under 
federal law, notably racketeering and local corruption offenses.  This 
significantly transformed federal criminal law jurisdiction.  A half-century later, 
the Travel Act is emblematic of the bold, aggressive, and expansive federal law 
enforcement that evolved from RFK’s influence. 
The fiftieth anniversary of the Travel Act provides an opportunity to 
acknowledge once again the significant difficulties facing local law enforcement 
in prosecuting many types of complex crime.  Despite still oft-cited platitudes 
about the states as primary protectors of law and order, any serious consideration 
of contemporary criminal justice administration issues must recognize the 
necessity of a broad federal criminal law jurisdiction in order to effectively 
prosecute complex financial fraud, organized crime, and public corruption. 
Looking back on the Travel Act and the other RFK Justice Department 
initiatives is not simply an exercise in nostalgia.  Today, ascending theories of a 
new federalism and Tea Party-inspired politics continue to call into question the 
legitimacy of the expansive federal government.  These attacks, though often not 
primarily directed at federal criminal law, nevertheless have the potential to 
seriously weaken a half-century of modern federal criminal law enforcement.  
An even moderately weakened federal law enforcement role would curtail 
current accepted notions of federal criminal jurisdiction, significantly impede 
federal law enforcement, and return the country to a state of affairs in which 
state law enforcement, in many areas, would be inadequate or incapable of 
effectively addressing these problems.  Modern criminal justice administration 
cannot devolve to such a retched and untenable state. 
In acknowledging the fiftieth anniversary of the Travel Act, the contemporary 
challenge must be directed at articulating bold and sound constitutional, legal, 
and policy principles so that modern federal criminal law remains relevant and 
effective in addressing the necessary priorities of today and tomorrow.  That this 
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Article may offer a new generation of lawyers and legal scholars an opportunity 
to examine RFK and his Justice Department’s role in shaping modern federal 
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